The US "Discourse Offensive" on China's Mekong Policy: A Perspective on Critical Discourse Analysis(selection)
Ren Hua, Assistant Researcher, Centre for the Study of Peripheral Diplomacy, Yunnan University, Institute of International Relations, and BRI Research Institute, Yunnan University, Laboratory of Philosophical and Social Sciences, Ministry of Education;
Lu Guangsheng, Professor, Centre for the Study of Peripheral Diplomacy, Yunnan University, Institute of International Relations, Doctoral Supervisor.
Since 2019, the US has been increasing its public opinion investment on the Mekong issue, gradually forming a well-structured and functional discourse system on China's Mekong policy, with the aim of not only intervening in the Mekong issue in an appropriate role, but also shaping and worsening the public opinion environment against China. In terms of discourse subject structure, the US discourse on China's Mekong policy is characterized by a combination of horizontal and vertical discourse structures centered on the US; in terms of content structure, it is strongly intertextual, converting scientific discourse into political discourse, politicizing and securitizing the Mekong issue, and demonizing China. The discourse functions to morally glorify US behaviors while demeaning China, and to rally the forces on its side to divide cooperation between China and the Mekong countries by exaggerating China's negative impact on the Mekong and by metaphorically referring to China's lack of responsibility for the Mekong. Therefore, China needs to reverse its lack of discourse on the Mekong in terms of enriching the structure of the subject and content of the discourse, and changing its discourse pattern and ostrich mentality on the Mekong.
[Keywords] US; China; Mekong policy; Mekong cooperation; critical discourse analysis
I. Problem Formulation and Theoretical Perspective
(i) Formulation of the problem
The US Mekong policy towards China is a product of the US global siege of China. Since 2009, With the introduction of the "Pivot to Asia-Pacific" strategy, the US has increased its involvement in the Mekong region. Under the Trump administration, the Mekong issue has become increasingly important in the US strategy towards China, and the US has placed greater emphasis on competing with China in the region. The US has not only put forward a number of geopolitical and economic strategies, but has also gradually developed a Mekong policy that focuses on criticism of China and a 'discursive offensive' against China in public opinion. Geographically, Southeast Asia is the geographical and diplomatic center of the US Indo-Pacific Strategy, and the Mekong-US Partnership is part of the Indo-Pacific Strategy. The intersection of these two in the Mekong region forms the broad framework and direction of US Mekong policy, which has greatly enhanced the position of the Mekong region in the US' efforts to contain China's development and influence.
The overall strategic intent of the US Mekong policy is to maintain US influence and overall dominance in the Mekong region, while at the same time curbing Chinese influence. The strategy is to "engage" and "pressure" at the same time The US has not only enhanced its substantive relations with the Mekong countries through mechanisms such as Mekong-US Partnership, the Lower Mekong Four Foreign Ministers Meeting, and the Friends of the Lower Mekong, but also some projects like the Mekong Environment Cooperation Project, the Mekong Sustainable Infrastructure Project, the Mekong Smart Infrastructure Project and the Lower Mekong Public Policy Initiative. Since 2019 and especially since May 2020, the U.S. has made frequent efforts against China on the Mekong issue, created a "discourse offensive" against China. On 15 December 2020, the Mekong Dam Monitoring Project, funded by the US State Department, was launched. The main objective of the project is to use satellite remote sensing data to "track" the reservoir levels of 13 dams on the main stretch of the Mekong River and 15 tributary dams with a generating capacity of over 200 MW. In late February 2021, State Department spokesman Ned Price tweeted that the US was "concerned about declining water levels on the Mekong" and "joined the region in calling on China to share important water resources data, including information on the operation of upstream dams, in a timely manner". It is foreseeable that the Biden administration will continue to be critical of China on the Mekong, and that its Mekong policy will continue to improve.
Scholarly research on the competition between the US and China in the Mekong region and on US policy towards China on the Mekong focuses on the game, institutions and concepts of the great powers. According to Li Zhifei, "the US has adopted both hard and soft checks and balances on China in the Mekong region, with institutional checks and balances being the main element of soft checks and balances, and water security being an important vehicle for institutional checks and balances." Wang Tao and Yang Yingqi analyse the cases of the International Commission for the Protection of the Danube, the Mekong River Commission and the Nile Basin Initiative, and show that the degree of completeness of the nested mechanisms consisting of transboundary river cooperation mechanisms and regional political and economic communities is positively correlated with the effectiveness of transboundary river cooperation mechanisms. According to Li Wuangying, the competition between China and the US in terms of multilateralism is the deep-seated reason for the competition between the two countries in the Mekong sub-regional cooperation mechanism, which is reflected in their different logics and practices in terms of issue areas, cooperation paths and expected benefits. Under the Trump administration, the US Mekong policy has placed great emphasis on criticism of China in public opinion, forming a well-structured, clear and influential 'critical discourse' to create a negative image of China on the Mekong and to create a discursive environment for its Mekong policy. Based on existing research, this article attempts to study the US discourse on China's Mekong policy from the perspective of Critical Discourse Analysis, and suggests how China can better respond to the US "discourse offensive" in its discourse system.
(ii) Theoretical perspectives
"Critical discourse analysis", emerged in the 1980s in the United Kingdom and has its origins in critical linguistics. The main representatives of critical discourse analysis include several anti-mainstream linguists and sociolinguists from the UK, France and Germany, who have put forward different models of critical discourse research and formed different schools of critical discourse analysis. Norman Fairclough, for example, first used the concept of "critical discourse analysis" in 1989, and proposed a three-dimensional model of the terms "description", "inter-pretation" and "explanation" These three models correspond to discourse as text, discourse as discursive activity and discourse as social activity. G. Kreis sees critical discourse as a form of ideological expression; R. Fowler sees discourse producers as regulating interpersonal relations, more or less ignoring the emotional identity of the recipient of the discourse. Over the years, critical discourse analysis has developed into a more sophisticated and mature theoretical framework, with strong explanatory power in many areas. It has strong explanatory power and application value in many fields. The study of critical discourse analysis is generally directed at the language and texts of news reports, political speeches and official documents. In practice, critical discourse analysis has been closely linked to the fields of linguistics, cognition and sociology, and has been used in different fields of critical discourse research.
The study of critical discourse in the field of international relations has focused on critical discourse in war and conflict. As the only superpower and the most widely spoken language in the world, the US has often had a significant influence on critical discourse towards others. Throughout history, the US has often used its hegemonic position to construct 'critical discourses' against other countries, using carefully constructed and manipulated critical discourses, metaphorically and exaggerated, to achieve the effect of aggregating its own power and dividing the power of others. Some studies have examined the US's role in the Bosnian War, the 2003 'Iraq War', as well as the fight against terrorism carried out by various countries since the beginning of the 21st century. The US has also continued to criticise other countries, especially China, in areas such as energy strategy, environmental issues and the control of the COVID19 epidemic. However, there are no studies of US discourse on China's Mekong policy from the perspective of critical discourse analysis. However, no research has been conducted on the US discourse on China's Mekong policy from the perspective of critical discourse analysis.
Therefore, based on the Norman-Fairclough three-dimensional model, this article examines the ideological confrontation behind the US discourse on China's Mekong policy and its impact on international relations in the Mekong region. The study of the US discourse on China's Mekong policy is a way to "know the enemy and know oneself" in order to prevent problems before they arise, and also to study how to better safeguard national security from a soft power perspective. The study of the US discourse on China's Mekong policy and its manipulation can help to improve or even reverse China's previous discursive dilemma on the Mekong, enhance China's international image in the Mekong region and better safeguard China's national security. On the other hand, it is about 'knowing oneself'. Based on a study of the discourse structure, content structure and discourse functions of the US (government, media, think tanks, NGOs and other actors) in relation to China's Mekong policy, it is proposed that China's Mekong policy should enrich the discourse subject structure and content structure, build a Mekong corpus and diversify the discourse model, in order to safeguard China's interests and national security in the Mekong region.
II. The discursive structure of US Mekong policy towards China
On the Mekong issue, US think tanks and the government have been working together to build a discourse on China since 2009.3. The Stimson Center, a Washington think tank, published a study in 2010 recommending that the US should strengthen its engagement with the lower Mekong countries. The US government has increased its substantive involvement in the Mekong issue by upgrading its relations with the Mekong countries. From the Lower Mekong Initiative (LMI) proposed by the Obama administration in 2009 to the upgrading of the LMI to the Mekong-US Partnership in 2020. "In August 2021, during her visit to Southeast Asia, US Vice President Harris elevated the Mekong-US Partnership to the same strategic level as the US-Japan-India-Australia Quadrilateral Security Dialogue. The framework for cooperation between the US and the Mekong countries has been greatly expanded. In terms of discourse structure, the US approach is to bring together different actors in the discourse that may be involved in Mekong issues (mainly the lower Mekong countries and US allies in the Asia-Pacific region) to support their positions on the Mekong, so that the US can intervene in the Mekong in a suitable capacity and 'legally' , openly.
The structure of the subject of discourse reflects the interests and power relations between different subjects behind the discourse. Through direct funding or indirect influence, the US government allows several discourse subjects involved in the Mekong issue to criticise China on the Mekong in accordance with the US government's intentions. The structure of the US discourse on China's Mekong policy is characterised by a combination of horizontal and vertical discourse structures, with the aim of creating and accumulating critical discourse against China on the Mekong through different discourse subjects. On the one hand, the US has formed a horizontal discourse structure by tying the interests of the US and the Mekong countries to a certain extent through its network of aid partners, but this discourse structure is rather loose; on the other hand, at home, the US government supports domestic discourse actors (such as the media, think tanks and NGOs) to publish political statements, news reports and reports related to the Mekong issue through funding and academic exchanges.
1. Horizontal Discourse Structure
The Mekong issue was originally not directly related to the US, but the US has been involved in the Mekong issue for a long time. Historically, the US has been trying to strike a balance between those behind the scenes and those directly involved for many years, with the aim of ensuring a US presence on the Mekong issue without creating an immediate conflict or even a sharp confrontation with China on the issue. The US has done a good job of translating its political influence in the Mekong region into a critical discourse on China, creating a horizontal discursive subject structure on China's Mekong policy in a number of ways. The main subjects of the US horizontal discourse on China's Mekong policy are its allies in the Mekong region, the Mekong countries (especially Vietnam), and NGOs in the Mekong region. The US has constructed a horizontal discourse structure on China's Mekong policy by cooperating with Vietnam and other Mekong countries, standing up for Mekong NGOs, and collaborating with Japan and other allied countries. The main strategies are as follows.
On the one hand, the US has become a 'stakeholder' in the Mekong issue through partnership networking, creating a suitable identity and 'legitimacy' for its involvement in the Mekong issue. During the Obama administration, the US proposed the "Mississippi-Mekong" cooperation program, which twinned the Mississippi River with the Mekong River. On 11 September 2020, the US, together with Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, Thailand, Vietnam and the ASEAN Secretariat, launched the Mekong-US Partnership to increase its influence on the Mekong region, and announced that it would provide US$150 million in assistance to the Mekong countries. Through the partnership network, the US gained status as a Mekong-related country and promoted the formation of a loose alliance with the US to contain China on the Mekong. While expanding its horizontal discourse, the US has transformed its role from outsider to insider, filling and changing its previous role as a stranger to the Mekong issue and providing a discursive identity for its participation in the Mekong issue and the construction of a critical discourse against China.
On the other hand, the US has strengthened its cooperation with the Mekong countries to enhance its substantive influence on the Mekong issue. The US has focused on bringing in the Mekong countries, especially Vietnam, which has been the most active on the Mekong issue, to strengthen its voice on the Mekong issue through cooperation with Vietnam. For Vietnam, its own strength is limited and it is difficult for it to form an effective counterweight to China on its own. Vietnam is therefore keen to engage with the US on the Mekong. During his visit to Vietnam on 28-29 October 2020, then US Secretary of State Pompeo not only declared that he was "eager for Vietnam to make concrete steps towards participating in the Indo-Pacific strategy", but also brought Vietnam $2 million in "flood aid". in an attempt to bring Vietnam into the fight against China over the Mekong. In addition to its own involvement in the Mekong issue, the US also brought in its allies such as Japan and South Korea, either through existing institutional platforms such as the Mekong River Commission or through the creation of US-led institutional platforms (e.g. the Mekong-US Partnership, the Mekong River Initiative, the Public-Private Partnership)., which have provided substantial funding and development projects to the Mekong countries, forming a horizontal discursive subject structure. The five lower Mekong countries all have hydropower development projects, and there is a huge market demand for regional power grids and other infrastructure development. In August 2019, the US and Japan formed the Mekong Power Partnership to actively engage in private investment and cross-border energy trade in the Mekong's power sector. Such moves by the US and Japan could lead to the creation of a new Mekong power sector. Such moves by the US and Japan are likely to crowd out the influence of China. Similarly, the "Friends of the Lower Mekong" foreign ministers' meeting (10 countries including Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, Thailand, Vietnam, the US, Japan, South Korea, Australia and New Zealand, and the EU), the US government's Lower Mekong Basin Initiative, the Japan-Mekong Partnership and the South Korea-Mekong Development Cooperation Programme, are also involved. These plans are clearly aimed at China. In the future, China is likely to face a deeper siege by more countries, led by the US.
2. The structure of the vertical discourse
The vertical discourse of the US on China's Mekong policy consists mainly of US official institutions, think tanks, scholars, as well as US-supported NGOs (mainly domestic NGOs) and the media. Through direct funding, the US organically connects these disparate discourse actors, creating and accumulating a corpus of critical discourse on China, and publishing political discourse, news reports and scientific studies on the Mekong in intertextual form.
Various US government agencies and NGOs such as the US Department of State, the Geological Survey, the Agency for International Development and the National Endowment for Democracy are involved in creating critical discourse against China on the Mekong. These include direct criticism of China (such as Secretary of State Pompeo's criticism of China on the Mekong during his term in office), as well as support for US think tanks, NGOs and scholars to conduct scientific research and studies on the Mekong's water resources through funding and academic exchanges (including academic conferences) to create a critical discourse against China. In 2010, the National Endowment for Democracy (NED) funded the Burma Rivers Network (BRN) and the Kachin Development Network (KDN) team to oppose the Myitsone Dam project, two US-funded NGOs that have long published reports criticising China, Thailand, India and other neighbouring countries for investing in hydropower projects in Myanmar's ethnic minority areas. The Burma Project has become the most funded project in Southeast Asia by the National Endowment for Democracy, with an average annual funding of over $4 million, and "environmental protection" as its main focus. These vertical subjects of discourse have been manipulated by the government as a tool for the US to confront China over the Mekong.
Generally speaking, in the vertical discourse structure, the status of each discourse subject is unequal, and there is a deep symbiosis between power and knowledge. The US has always adhered to the policy of freedom of expression and freedom of the press, and US think tanks and scholars have always been seen as independent of the government, with the media even referred to as the 'fourth power'. However, on the Mekong issue, some US think tanks, scholars and media have been highly aligned with the US government. The US government and its agencies have funded and influenced US think tanks, scholars and the media in various ways so that they support each other with the same corpus (what is referred to below as 'intertextuality'), creating a near-uniform critical discourse on the Mekong. In April 2020, the US government-funded NGO Eyes on Earth, the Stimson Center and the East ⁃West Center published a report on water use on the Lancang-Mekong River, "Monitoring Water Flows on the Upper Mekong under Natural Conditions", which blamed Chinese reservoir construction and water management in the upper Mekong region for the severe drought in 2019, using "data" to hype the Mekong River.
In practice, the US government relies on the above-mentioned discursive subject structure to construct a discursive alliance against China's Mekong policy at a relatively low cost and with a suitable identity, in order to achieve the following objectives: on the one hand, to construct its discursive identity on the Mekong issue and to coordinate a consistent position with other Mekong countries and allies in criticising China; on the other hand, d, to construct a discursive environment of criticism against China and an antagonistic identity between China and other Mekong countries.
(ii) The structure of the discursive content of the US Mekong policy towards China
According to the post-structuralist Derrida, "there is nothing beyond the text ". In terms of content, the US discourse on China's Mekong policy is characterized by an obvious intertextuality. It is characterized by a significant cross-referencing of texts from other subjects within the critical discourse of one subject. By cutting and reorganizing texts, the US transforms the discourse into a critical discourse that is favorable to the US in order to manipulate the discourse in a better way. Therefore, this section uses textual analysis as the main method to analyses the structure of the US discourse on China's Mekong River policy, taking US media reports on China in recent years (see Table 1) and using the Aristotelian classical rhetoric of "three recourses" (logos and pathos) as the framework. The discursive structure of the US policy on the Mekong River.
1. rational recourse
Often, intertextual links in official foreign discourse are made with texts that are not usually considered relevant to foreign policy analysis, such as studies and scientific research reports. In the case of the Mekong issue, which is centered on water resources and involves a number of unresolved scientific issues, the US has used intertextual approaches that transform scientific discourse (i.e. code switching) into political language or a mixture of the two to express its claims rationally.
In its Mekong policy, the US attaches great importance to the role of scientific language, such as research reports and scientific studies, and tries to build intertextual links with the official discourse through texts and discourses with some scientific significance, in order to enhance the credibility of its political discourse. The main means of manipulating content is through the use of scientific diplomacy as a disguise for cutting and reorganizing scientific tools and reports. The US government attaches great importance to the demonstration of various scientific tools in an attempt to construct a specific discourse on China's Mekong policy in the name of scientific methods and discourse. In using these scientific tools and discourses, the US deliberately abstracts, highlights and treats the Chinese factor as a negative factor, with a clear tendency to induce audiences to associate the Chinese factor with negative influences. The US Department of State, the US Geological Survey and its university partners have developed a graphical visualization tool (GVT) to present the Soil and Water Assessment Tool Soil and Water Assessment Tool (SWAT) to help decision makers and planners communicate and assess complex river scenarios. The US is working with the Mekong River Commission to enhance the integration of knowledge and models of river life in the Mekong Basin from source to delta, using computers, hydrographic measurements and SWAT visualization techniques. In fact, these scientific tools and discourses are being used in the Mekong Basin. In fact, these scientific tools and discourses are extremely limited, reflecting only part of the water resources and hydrology of the Mekong basin, and many of the abstraction tools used in scientific language are not universally applicable, and the applicability of their models in the Mekong region remains questionable.
The US has transformed scientific discourse into China's negative role and responsibility for the Mekong River by linking metaphors in scientific discourse to the Chinese factor and constructing China's negative influence on the Mekong. On 14 April 2020, the New York Times article "Study Says China Restricts Flow in Upper Mekong, Causing Drought in Many Downstream Countries" reads, the Chinese foreign ministry's statement that 'one of the world's most productive rivers is suffering from a drought, a problem that China is also facing' deceives downstream countries", citing a report by US climatologists that "China is not experiencing the same difficulties. The Mekong River originates on China's Tibetan Plateau, and Beijing's engineers seem to have contributed directly to record low water levels by restricting its flow". The article reinforces the hegemony of scientific discourse by linking it to the abstract scientific discourse and the concrete scenario of the Mekong drought. To lend credibility to the article, it also features an interview with Alan Basist, an American meteorologist who is a staunch opponent of the Mekong's hydroelectric development. In the interview, Basist asserts conclusively that "satellite data does not lie, there is a lot of water on the Tibetan plateau, even though countries like Cambodia and Thailand are being forced to face extreme threats" and that "a lot of water is being held back in China". In addition, in order to improve the reception of the general audience, the article also features a photo supposedly taken in Thailand in January 2020, with the text "A narrow section of water flowing over the dry bed of the Mekong".
It can be seen that the US uses strategies such as transforming scientific discourse into a negative role and responsibility of China, linking the abstract nature of scientific discourse to the concrete scenario of the Mekong drought, and using its hegemonic position in the field of science to express its rational recourse on the Mekong issue, trying to find scientific evidence that China is the "culprit" of the various problems of the Mekong, especially the drought.
2. Emotional appeals
The US has been consciously demonizing the Chinese factor by politicizing and securitizing the Mekong issue, so as to arouse the hostility of the Mekong countries towards China, and to disrupt the normal relations between China and the Mekong countries.
The US government has made long-term preparations to create hostility towards China on the Mekong issue, with a three-step approach. In November 2017, the US government published the Global Water Strategy report , which attempts to establish a link between "water governance - values - economy - security". The second step is to intervene in regional affairs in a high-profile manner. In 2018-2019, the US launched the "Indo-Pacific Strategy", one of the key objectives of which is to find support in Southeast Asia to counter Chinese influence. In 2018, Pompeo announced that the US would invest US$113 million in the Indo-Pacific region in three main areas: digital connectivity, energy projects and infrastructure development, with US$10 million earmarked for the US-ASEAN Connectivity Action Plan, the Lower Mekong Action Plan and other initiatives. The US will invest US$10 million in the "US-ASEAN Connectivity Initiative", the "Lower Mekong Initiative" and other related ASEAN mechanisms. This further builds on the "governance-economy-security" nexus. The third step is to develop concrete cooperation with the Mekong countries. Since 2019, the US and Vietnam have been working more closely on the Mekong issue, trying to create a security crisis against China through a discursive crisis. In line with or even earlier than the three steps mentioned above, the US media has continued to hype the "Chinese water threat theory" and other arguments on the Mekong issue, with several well-known US media outlets publishing several reports against China. "A direct causal link has been established between China's 'restrictions' on flows in the upper Mekong and the 'drought' in the lower Mekong (see Table 1).
The headline is an important part of the news text and its main characteristic is its "prominence". "The headline is a highly condensed language reminder of the main or most noteworthy content of the article. In the US media, headlines are worded in a highly negative and derogatory way, including "destroy", "water hegemony", "threaten", "kill" and "restrict" in relation to China portrays a highly irresponsible, arrogant and arrogant image of China, constructs a salient negative impact of China on the Mekong issue, and alienates China from its relations with the Mekong countries.
While portraying its virtues and good intentions, the US used a variety of different discursive subjects to focus on China's 'hegemonic position' and 'arrogance' through 'shocking' and 'impactful' headlines (see Table 1). The Washington Times, in its 2016 report on the Mekong River, has used a wide range of headlines to create an image of China's "hegemonic position" and "arrogance", thereby provoking hostility towards China from the Mekong countries. The Washington Times article "China's water hegemony in Asia", published on 26 April 2016, for example, begins by describing the severe drought in Southeast and South Asia in 2016 as a result of China's role as a water manager in the upper reaches of Asia, blocking water flow through water facilities; China's release of water to the lower Mekong countries is a demonstration of its water hegemony, and it arrogantly 'brags' about the effectiveness of its upstream dams in preventing droughts and floods in the region. The article also states that China is at the center of Asia's water map, but it refuses to sign water-sharing treaties with any of its neighbors. A similar pattern of reporting has been repeated in other US media.
The US is well aware that the Mekong countries are the most important targets for the Mekong issue. Therefore, the US government and the media have been using various methods to arouse a sense of insecurity among the Mekong countries and to create irrational hostility towards China. The US has mainly adopted a rhetorical strategy of convergence, using emotional propaganda to divide and incite the Mekong countries' hostility towards China, and to provoke anger in the Mekong countries towards China. The US media have argued that China has consciously and artificially caused the drought in the lower Mekong through deception and concealment, and this is the sole cause of the drought. No matter what China's response or action on the Mekong, or even if China takes responsibility, the US media always finds a way to stigmatize China, reflecting the fact that the US media has lost all independence of judgement and has become a tool for the US government to target and silence China on the Mekong. The article "Study says China's restrictions on upstream Mekong flow have caused droughts in many downstream countries", in addition to suggesting that China has bad intentions (e.g. "to make downstream countries thankful") for opening its floodgates during the dry season to replenish water for downstream countries, also illustrates the drought-stricken red land, red river water and boats parked on the banks of the Mekong, suggesting that China's responsibility is still insufficient. China's responsibility remains inadequate.
In addition to the New York Times, other US media such as the Washington Times and the Associated Press also actively supported the US government's Mekong policy, translating criticism of China into anger and hostility towards China from different angles. The Associated Press article "China's lack of sincerity in Southeast Asia" not only linked China's dams in the upper Mekong to the daily lives of the people in the Mekong countries, but also encouraged the Mekong countries and the people along the Mekong to demand that China take responsibility, which was highly inflammatory.
US media coverage of the Mekong issue is "lopsided" in its attitude towards China. China is not only portrayed as the "culprit" for environmental changes, water shortages and agricultural production in the downstream countries of the Mekong, especially Vietnam, but some news reports even place the Mekong issue alongside the Hong Kong issue, exposing the US media's attempts to create a "water hegemony" and more negative image of China through news reports. The US media's intention is to create a "water hegemony" and a more negative or "evil" image of China in order to provoke anger against China, especially among the people of the Mekong countries.
III. Discursive functions and implications of US Mekong policy towards China
Specific discourses can create threat identities, narrate crisis stories, create discursive barriers to the addressees, create discursive pressures, construct discursive crises, influence relevant policies, securitise specific issues, and influence the level of security, leading to different security policies and even contributing to war. The ultimate aim of the US discourse on China's Mekong policy is to build a discursive alliance around China in the south-western direction and to weaken China's influence.
(i) Aggregating and divisive functions
At the present stage, the US has not only begun to intervene substantially in the Mekong region, but is also trying to use its discourse to bring together the forces of the US-centered party, to create conflicts between China and the Mekong countries, and ultimately to give the US the dominant role in the Mekong issue.
On the one hand, the US deliberately portrays itself as a moral example and a benchmark of values on the Mekong issue. When discussing foreign policy, the speaker must not only describe his or her identity, but also demonstrate knowledge and, for politicians, responsibility and persuasiveness. In order to achieve its goals, the US has deliberately sought to be a moral example and a benchmark for values on the Mekong. In order to achieve its goals, the US has deliberately demonstrated its responsibility and 'outstanding contribution' to the Mekong basin in order to hide its strategic objectives.
First, the US continues to reinforce its common interests with the Mekong countries on the Mekong issue, tying US strategic objectives to the Mekong countries and even ASEAN countries. At the 2019 Lower Mekong Initiative (LMI) ministerial meeting, joint US engagement with extra-territorial actors on the Mekong has become more diverse. For example, the US has joined forces with South Korea to promote a project to use satellite imagery to assess flood and drought conditions on the Mekong; with Japan to launch the Japan-US Mekong Power Partnership to develop the Mekong region's electricity grid, with a commitment of US$29.5 million; and with experts from the World Bank, Australia, France and Japan. The US Embassy in Beijing is also working with experts from the World Bank, Australia, France and Japan to conduct safety inspections of 55 dams in Laos. On the website of the US Embassy in Beijing, the US publicly declares that "the Mekong-US partnership is an integral part of its Indo-Pacific vision and strategic partnership with ASEAN.
Secondly, the US has highlighted its contribution to the Mekong countries on key issues (such as its cooperation with the Mekong countries on infectious diseases over the past 20 years or so) and has promised to increase aid and investment in the Mekong countries in the future to help them combat transnational crime (including drug trafficking, human, arms and wildlife trafficking), paving the way for its image as a moral paragon and benchmark of values in the Mekong region. The Mekong countries will also increase their assistance and investment in the fight against transnational crime (including drug trafficking, human, arms and wildlife trafficking).
Thirdly, the US also uses contrasts to further develop a positive and positive image of itself in the Mekong region. In contrast to the use of numerous negative and derogatory terms to describe China's behaviors, the US government uses the terms "support economic growth", "develop infrastructure", "invest billions of dollars more " " increase development and economic growth " " enhance support for energy security and power sector development " and other positive terms to portray US behaviors in the Mekong region , while the US has avoided any mention of its strategic intentions to maintain its global water leadership, share regional development dividends, contain Chinese influence and export US values.
On the other hand, the US discourse on China's Mekong policy is deliberately directed at China and vilifies it. The US media has also gone to great lengths to maintain a discourse consistent with that of the US government. In "China's 'old mahogany' demand destroys Mekong forests", the New York Times cites a report by the London-based Environmental Investigation Agency, which argues that "the Mekong countries' laws prohibit the cutting and export of the wood, but China's demand for the richly colored wood (known in China as "old mahogany") is so high that promoting illegal logging and smuggling throughout the region. "The high demand for luxury furniture and the revival of cultural traditions in China has not only destroyed the forests of neighboring countries in Southeast Asia, but has also triggered a wave of crime throughout the region. It has also sparked a wave of crime throughout the region, even resulting in deaths". The US uses negative or pejorative terms such as "challenging", "threatening", "unilateral" and "predatory" to create an image of a unilateralist, self-absorbed China. This shows that the US is not only glorifying its actions while vilifying China, but is also hiding its sinister intentions to undermine cooperation in the region, with the ultimate aim of bringing together its own forces to divide the friendly relations and cooperation between China and the Mekong countries.
(ii) Exaggerating and consolidating functions
By highlighting China's "threat" to the Mekong River basin and its lack of responsibility in news headlines and discourse, US official agencies and media portray and exaggerate China's negative role in the Mekong issue.
Firstly, the US media's reporting on the Mekong issue is not based on objective facts and a neutral stance, and it has become a habit to highlight the "threat" of China. The US media often exaggerate the impact of the Chinese factor on the Mekong issue by highlighting China in headlines, with the strategy of making China the 'subject' of the story (the subject of the headline or sentence and negative terms such as 'threat' the 'narrative'. In a number of reports in the US media, "China" as a subject position appears alongside negative terms such as "threat" as a descriptive position, one after the other, with the intention of portraying China as the origin of the Mekong issue and highlighting China's "central" position in many Mekong issues. "This is intended to highlight China's 'central' position in the Mekong's problems and to establish a necessary link between China and the threat to the Mekong countries.
Secondly, the US has joined forces with other actors in the horizontal discourse to create a negative image of China's lack of responsibility in the Mekong issue. The US has taken advantage of the bias of some Mekong countries and organizations, especially Vietnam and the Mekong River Commission (MRC), towards China to demand that China take more responsibility for the Mekong issue. The US criticism of China has already had an impact on Vietnam and the Mekong River Commission. In April 2020, the Mekong River Commission (MRC) released its report "Hydrological Conditions in the Lower Mekong Basin January-July 2020", which continues to accuse China of pumping water upstream, causing droughts downstream and requiring China to recharge water downstream. While continuing to accuse China of pumping water upstream, causing drought downstream and requiring China to recharge water downstream, the report also calls for more hydrological information from China during the dry season. Although the report also notes that the impact of China's hydropower operations on the lower reaches of the Mekong is less pronounced due to the greater proportion of inflows from its tributaries in the flow, its tendency to blame China for climate extremes such as drought remains clear. On 16 June 2020, the Mekong River Commission's Annual Report 2019 also called on China to disclose safety standards for upstream dams.
Thirdly, the US is also trying to weaken China's voice on the Mekong issue, further entrenching the Mekong countries' negative perception of China's "irresponsibility" on the Mekong. This is reflected in two ways: on the one hand, it accuses China of failing to assume its due and full international responsibility. In March 2016, China made a rare compromise with Vietnam by opening the floodgates of several dams in Yunnan province to release water," wrote the New York Times in "Drying up the Mekong Delta: Vietnam's farmers struggle to survive". But Vietnamese authorities said the water flow was too small to make a difference to the plight of Vietnam's rice farmers." Following the Mekong River Commission's announcement of the Chinese release, Brian Eyler, director of the Stimson Center's Southeast Asia Program, argued that the Chinese release was "a carefully crafted public relations effort by China" that was "not unique or commendable" and that "every relationship with China has been a success. " and that "every deal with China comes with a price".
On the other hand, it is argued that even though China has taken some responsibility, it has still failed to meet all the demands of the downstream countries. Since China has no water treaty with the lower Mekong countries, and during the monsoon season, it can only provide limited data on the flow of the upper Lancang River. The US has encouraged the Mekong countries to demand that China take more responsibility for sharing water resources by making data publicly available and releasing it on a year-round basis. The US has also demanded that China share upstream data, including data on dam operations, and that this data be shared through the Mekong River Commission rather than other platforms.
(iii) Metaphorical function
The US media uses two different discursive modes to metaphorically describe the serious threat that China poses to the Mekong countries and the people along its banks in relation to water resources.
The first is the ambiguous jumping discourse mode. Storytelling is one of the most important modes of discourse that can be used to communicate a story in a way that is concrete and relevant to the everyday lives of ordinary people. The US media uses storytelling as a means of moving from empathy to consensus.
The US media shift the strong and weak subjects in the story to gain empathy between the US and the Mekong countries and their people, and to insinuate the negative role of the Chinese factor in the Mekong issue. In the New York Times article "The Killed God: How Dams and Chinese Power Threaten the Mekong", the daily lives of people along the Mekong are depicted in a story that deliberately creates a sharp contrast between the poverty and backwardness of the remote areas of the Mekong countries and the behaviors of China, implying that China is the troublemaker of the Mekong issue. The text uses the Chinese character 'demolition' to represent the change in the fate of the small Lao village of Lat Thahae along the Mekong River by the construction of a dam in the village of Lat Thahae by China (the strong). This is a metaphor for China's enormous capacity to change the status quo in the Mekong region, setting the stage for the 'China threat theory'. The article also features an interview with a female villager (the underdog) named See, who shows the helplessness and hopelessness of an illiterate farmer in the face of China's power. Similar stories abound in the reports, which aim to 'situate' China's 'sinister' attempts to change the environment on which the Mekong people depend, and to empathize with the Mekong countries in their efforts to contain China's influence with the US. The Mekong region is a region where the US has a strong influence.
Secondly, the linear continuum of discourse. As Table 2 shows, behind this linear pattern of discourse is the logical closure of the US insistence on "downstream drought - upstream water interdiction - Chinese deliberate" in relation to the Mekong.
The US media is very good at telling big stories (big narratives) through small people (small protagonists), using a strong contrast between "small" and "big" and a linear continuity of speech patterns to metaphorically portray China as being "rude and unreasonable","self-righteous" on the Mekong issue. In the article "The Killed "God": How Dams and Chinese Power Threaten the Mekong", the New York Times, based on interviews with local people, environmental organizations and other professional discourse subjects, relied on "reasoning" without sufficient scientific basis and without rigorous evidence, to conclude that the construction of the Nam Ou River hydropower plant by Sinohydro in Laos had led to land acquisition and demolition and caused many conflicts, and even exaggerated that the Chinese hydropower plant would kill the future of the Mekong River.
Although the US media's reporting has significant logical flaws and falsifications, the impact has been very negative as it has been read by a largely undiscerning public and has used graphic and vivid storytelling methods that are more accessible to ordinary people. In collaboration with the US government, the discourse on China's Mekong policy has served the purpose of both constructing things through language and shaping the discursive environment and discursive legitimacy of China's Mekong policy, as well as its moral and ethical goodwill, in order to smear and even demonise China and create a discursive threat against it.