[SEA] [India]India-ASEAN Foreign Ministers Meeting Ahead
Yunnan Finance Indian Ocean Centre Research on Southeast Asia
Introduction to this issue
From 15 to 17 June, India will meet with the foreign ministers of ASEAN countries on the occasion of 30 years of dialogue between India and ASEAN and the 10th anniversary of the India-ASEAN Strategic Partnership. Last month, during Biden's trip to Asia, seven countries - the United States, India, Australia, Japan, South Korea, New Zealand and ASEAN - issued a statement in Tokyo on the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework (IPEF), declaring a free, open, equitable, inclusive, interconnected, resilient, secure and prosperous Indo-Pacific region with the potential for sustainable and inclusive economic growth. A prosperous Indo-Pacific region with the potential for sustainable and inclusive economic growth. The US-sponsored Indo-Pacific Economic Framework (IPEF) has provoked different voices from ASEAN countries due to its strong geopolitical overtones, and India has previously been cautious. What are the reasons for India's choice to join the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework? Will the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework be a key topic of discussion at the upcoming Foreign Ministers' meeting? Will India's relationship with ASEAN be significantly enhanced? In this issue, RIIO discusses with you:
The Indo-Pacific Economic Framework (IPEF) is part of the US Indo-Pacific Strategy, which was launched and promoted by the US to enhance its economic and strategic interests, reshape US economic leadership in the Indo-Pacific region, and re-establish a US-led economic order in Asia, while weakening China's regional economic influence. The Indo-Pacific Economic Framework (IPEF) was initiated and promoted by the US to enhance its economic and strategic interests, to reestablish US economic leadership in the Indo-Pacific region, to re-establish the US-led order in Asia, and to weaken China's regional economic influence. As part of the Indo-Pacific Strategy, India's role is clearly integral to the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework. This is partly why the US wants ASEAN to play a "central" role in the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework, but instead of launching it during the special US-ASEAN summit on 12-13 May, it chose to launch took place during the Leaders' Face-to-Face Summit of the QUAD Security Dialogue in Tokyo on 23-24 May. Some observers have suggested that the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework (IPEF) is a Quad+ASEAN initiative. Whether or not it is a Quad+ASEAN initiative, it is clear that the Indian factor is a consideration in the US' promotion of the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework. India has previously been cautious and hesitant to join the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework, and on May 21, before Modi's trip to Tokyo for the summit, an Indian foreign ministry spokesperson had claimed that "it is a US initiative and India is looking into it." Why has India chosen to join? First, unlike RCEP and CPTPP, the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework (IPEF) is not a free trade agreement and trade is only one of the four pillars. "The Indo-Pacific Economic Framework claims that member countries can choose from among the four pillars what best suits their needs, which is obviously very flexible. Moreover, the framework is still under discussion and adjustment, and in India's view there is more "room for manoeuvre", and India can choose to join first and discuss later. Secondly, the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework is US-led and without China's participation, India believes it may well have the opportunity to play a key role in flexible supply chains and clean energy initiatives. India is more concerned that a China-led or participatory economic initiative would put it at a greater disadvantage than the India-US economic divide. Thirdly, joining the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework could provide New Delhi with an opportunity to deepen India-ASEAN economic cooperation. The Indo-Pacific Economic Framework is expected to compensate for the "loss" of India's economic cooperation with ASEAN as a result of its withdrawal from the RCEP negotiations. Fourthly, Modi's choice to join the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework as an initial member is based on strategic considerations rather than economic ones. New Delhi is aware that its importance to Washington is more of a strategic value than an economic benefit, and that India is a key player in the US Indo-Pacific Strategy. This is likely to lead the US to make concessions to India on issues such as trade differences. Indeed, the extent of India's involvement remains highly uncertain. After all, on the one hand, joining the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework has increased the pressure to open up India's markets, which have always been characterised by strong trade protectionism; on the other hand, there have been many differences between India and the US at the level of economic engagement, including, in addition to trade differences, high standards (especially labour standards), digital governance, and data localisation requirements in the financial services sector. The Indian and US economic engagement, on the other hand, has been marked by many differences, including high standards (especially labour standards), digital governance, data localisation requirements in the financial services sector, in addition to trade differences. India may, of course, be hopeful that these differences can be resolved through negotiations in the future. Moreover, India's participation in the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework means that India's future participation in the RCEP is less likely.
--Zhu Cuiping
The Indo-Pacific Economic Framework (IPEF) initiated by the United States has a clear geopolitical orientation and lacks substantive commitments to promote economic and trade cooperation in the Indo-Pacific region, so some ASEAN countries participating in the IPEF do not have much incentive to promote it. For ASEAN to maintain its "central position" in the Asia-Pacific, it is only possible to cooperate in an open and inclusive economic framework, and not to choose sides in a geopolitical strategy, especially one that aims to counterbalance China, which is not in the overall interest of ASEAN. In order for ASEAN to maintain a balance between the competing US and China in the Asia-Pacific, in addition to preserving its relationship with the two countries, it needs to strengthen its interaction with a wider range of actors to hedge against the possible negative effects of Sino-US competition. Deepening relations with countries that have important interests in the Indo-Pacific region has therefore become an important part of ASEAN's hedging strategy. The ASEAN-India commemorative meetings in the middle of next month will also be an opportunity to strengthen bilateral relations as part of ASEAN's efforts to gain India's recognition of its "centrality" to the Asia-Pacific region. It is not India's pride in its democratic institutions or its unique economic development potential that makes it a country that the major players in the Indo-Pacific region are currently clamouring for. India is aware that, despite being drawn in by all sides in the US-China rivalry, it is not really that important because of its strength, and therefore needs to take advantage of the diplomatic gains of recent years to strengthen relations with key actors, including ASEAN. India hopes to take advantage of the 30th anniversary of its dialogue with ASEAN and the 10th anniversary of the India-ASEAN Strategic Partnership to hold a meeting with ASEAN foreign ministers to achieve three major diplomatic objectives. The first is to strengthen economic and trade relations with ASEAN to hedge against the adverse impact of the withdrawal from the RCEP negotiations; the second is to further strengthen relations with ASEAN to balance China's growing influence in ASEAN; and the third is to discuss with ASEAN under the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework in the light of the significant changes in the industrial and value chains in the wake of the New Pneumonia epidemic. The third is to explore economic and trade cooperation with ASEAN under the "Indo-Pacific Economic Framework" in the light of the major changes in the industrial and value chains following the new pneumonia outbreak. The India-ASEAN Foreign Ministers' meeting in mid-June should allow India and ASEAN to reach a consensus on cooperation in these areas of interest, but it will be difficult for both sides to achieve these agreements.
--Liu Mou
This is potentially the best time for India to strengthen its relations with ASEAN. Historically, India has had diverse political, social and cultural ties based on trade with most Asian countries, particularly in Southeast Asia, and these ties have not been broken even after the Islamzation of Indonesia and Malaysia, where there are still as many as six million Indian and Indian-origin immigrants. However, the post-independence confrontation with Pakistan and the US political expansion in Southeast Asia did not give Nehru the opportunity to realise his strategic vision of pan-Asianism, and Indira Gandhi's preoccupation with regional power in South Asia missed the opportunity to forge closer ties with the economically rising countries of Southeast Asia at this stage. At the same time, India's role in the international community has always been highly regarded, and as the leader of the Non-Aligned Movement, it has sought to establish itself as a world-class power, but despite its commitment to great power diplomacy, it has not paid enough attention to its immediate neighbours, so much so that ASEAN countries have complained that India "In November 2014, speaking at the annual ASEAN summit, Modi proposed to launch an 'Eastward Action Policy' to replace the old 'Eastward Policy'. On 26 January 2018, Modi also invited heads of government from ASEAN countries to India's Republic Day celebrations in New Delhi, underscoring India's determination to continue to strengthen its ties with the East, and India's full membership of the East Asia Summit and the ASEAN Defence Ministers' Meeting was once seen as a sign that a sign that "India has gradually been accepted as an 'Asia-Pacific' country", but India's withdrawal from the RCEP negotiations in 2019 has undoubtedly been a great disappointment to ASEAN countries. Now, amidst the changing global landscape, India seems to have another major opportunity to strengthen its ties with ASEAN. More than ever, India is eager to become an influential player in the Indo-Pacific region, with unprecedentedly active and aggressive diplomacy; in the view of Indian strategic and economic circles, it is also the best time ever for India to strengthen its political and economic and trade ties with ASEAN countries, as India's regional role has changed. For ASEAN, India is no longer an indifferent near neighbour, but a power that can counterbalance China's growing influence and act as a mediator and buffer between the values divide in Southeast Asia and Europe and the US. India's relatively flexible and independent line on Myanmar confirms this, and gives ASEAN countries a sense of respect from India. However, determination is determination and commitment is commitment, and past history shows that there has always been a gap between India's willingness and ability to play a significant role in Asia. The 'geo-economic' dimension and the 'geopolitical' dimension are interdependent and mutually supportive if India is to regain its convening power and axial role in Southeast Asia, a region where it has historically had a significant influence. Therefore, if India is to re-establish its geo-identity, it should also demonstrate the capacity and determination to build an economic network centred on India. In other words, it remains to be seen whether India will be able to match any political promises it makes with an equivalent investment of resources, beyond its role as a 'counterweight' and 'coordinator'.
--Yi-Shang Yang
From the "Eastward Policy" to the "Eastward Action Policy", India's relations with ASEAN have developed on all fronts, with more than 30 bilateral dialogue mechanisms in place, notably a summit mechanism and seven ministerial-level dialogue mechanisms. As India and ASEAN actively participate in each other's multilateral platforms, such as the ASEAN East Asia Summit, the ASEAN Maritime Forum and the ASEAN Defence Ministers' Meeting, India's hosting of the Ministerial Meeting in June 2022, which will mark the 30th anniversary of the bilateral dialogue and the 10th anniversary of the bilateral strategic partnership, is likely to include, firstly India and ASEAN may explore the issue of upgrading the strategic partnership between India and ASEAN, which followed in the footsteps of the 2011 upgrade of diplomatic relations between China and ASEAN in 2012 and again in 2021 to a comprehensive strategic partnership, and then India and ASEAN may also explore the issue of following up; secondly, as China and ASEAN discussed at the 30th anniversary summit of the bilateral dialogue relationship in 2021 Secondly, as China and ASEAN discussed cooperation under the RCEP framework at the 30th anniversary bilateral summit in 2021, India and ASEAN may continue to discuss cooperation under the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework, such as cooperation on connectivity, investment, supply chains and maritime security, in addition to bilateral FTA issues. Overall, there is a good basis for India and ASEAN to continue to expand economic and trade cooperation under the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework, with India being ASEAN's third largest trading partner in 2021, ASEAN being India's fifth largest trading partner, and ASEAN being India's third largest engineering export market. However, in the long run, there are still some problems in bilateral economic cooperation. For example, India and ASEAN are making slow progress at the level of connectivity cooperation, and many infrastructural cooperation is still at the exploration stage; at the same time, trade protectionism still plagues bilateral economic and trade development, and ASEAN exports to India often encounter non-tariff barriers, which also makes it difficult to successfully implement the relevant bilateral FTAs signed; in addition, India's economic and trade cooperation with ASEAN is biased and selective, and its trade is mainly with Its trade is mainly with Indonesia, Thailand, Myanmar and Vietnam, and more than 90% of bilateral investment comes from India-Singapore investment cooperation. At present, the main areas of cooperation between India and ASEAN are health and safety, the digital (ICT) economy and green and sustainable development, and both sides have recently held consultations or meetings specifically on vaccines, flexible supply chains, digital technology and green development.
--Li Yanfang
To mark the 30th anniversary of the India-ASEAN dialogue and the 10th anniversary of the India-ASEAN Strategic Partnership, India will invite 10 ASEAN foreign ministers for an India-ASEAN Summit from 15 to 17 June. The India-ASEAN Summit will be held from 15 to 17 June to mark the 30th anniversary of the India-ASEAN dialogue and the 10th anniversary of the India-ASEAN strategic partnership. The summit was held on the 30th anniversary of the China-ASEAN dialogue, which elevated China-ASEAN relations to a comprehensive strategic partnership, and it is clear that India's intention to hold this summit to mark the 30th anniversary of its dialogue with ASEAN is to consolidate its relations with Southeast Asian countries, enhance its international status and demonstrate its posture as a great power. After all, India has been dreaming of being a major power since the Nehru era. Since the arrival of the Modi-led Hindutva government, New Delhi's aspirations for international status have grown stronger, with a desire to be recognised as a world power on an equal footing with other major powers. In previous years, India had established and maintained very close political, economic and cultural ties with ASEAN, guided by the "Eastward Policy" and the "Eastward Action Policy"; in recent years, against the backdrop of the epidemic, the need for economic recovery and the previous In recent years, the need for economic recovery against the backdrop of the epidemic and Modi's ambitious "Make in India" economic development strategy have further increased the importance of Southeast Asia in India's economic development. The recent launch of the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework (IPEF) by the United States, in which India and seven of the ten ASEAN countries are involved, may have the potential to save India's market development costs and help Indian companies to expand and operate overseas. In this context, for India, interaction with ASEAN through the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework may have the effect of reducing the cost of developing Indian markets, helping Indian companies to expand and operate overseas, and providing overseas support for India's economic growth. In terms of political aspirations, the Modi government has convened this India-ASEAN summit to hedge against Chinese influence and to demonstrate its effectiveness in aligning with the US Indo-Pacific Strategy, and to demonstrate India's strategic focus. The Modi government is increasingly interested in developing strategic partnerships with smaller countries in its strategic neighbourhood, not just with major powers. However, India's hosting of this conference will probably be more retreat than pragmatic. Indeed, while the two sides share some common dynamics in strengthening strategic cooperation, they also face a number of practical difficulties. On the one hand, India's low human cost advantage, the lack of desire for wealth among the lower class, the absence of an entrepreneurial class, and the attempts by some local forces to block modern industrial development, for example, have determined that there are many challenges to India's external economic development; on the other hand, India and ASEAN have a certain degree of competition in terms of economic development stage and industrial structure, with little complementarity, and if the two sides are to cooperate for the sake of cooperation cooperation for the sake of cooperation, it is bound to be difficult to make a difference.
--Feng Chuanlu
The further development and enhancement of India-ASEAN relations is formally in line with the logic of their respective diplomatic strategies, but I am afraid that it will not be easy to find out from the forthcoming India-ASEAN Foreign Ministers' meeting how much substantive benefits this set of relations will yield for each side and how much practical impact it will have on the regional and global political and economic landscape. The answer to these questions will not be easy to obtain from the forthcoming India-ASEAN Foreign Ministers' Meeting. In the current Indo-Pacific context, the development of India's relations with ASEAN can be said to face two major advantages and two disadvantages. The first is that both sides are on the rise in terms of international standing, and progress in India-ASEAN relations will not only help to improve their neighbourhood, but also give them a greater voice in the international arena; the second is that there is a real incentive for both sides to come closer in terms of international political demands. India's 'Eastward Initiative Policy' is a fundamental step towards its self-proclaimed status as a 'global power', and the fact that it can leverage the ASEAN economy to promote India's rapid economic development is the icing on the cake. For ASEAN, any formal recognition of ASEAN's 'centrality', whether by the US, Japan or other extraterritorial powers, or by India, would be a fulcrum for its 'balanced diplomacy'. Although "multi-party balancing" increases the complexity of ASEAN's diplomatic environment, it also enhances the flexibility of its foreign policy, which is why in recent years we have seen that ASEAN has been very receptive to external "courting", in line with the This is in line with the rational logic of its diplomatic strategy. At the same time, however, the development of India's relations with ASEAN will continue to face a number of disadvantages in the short term. One of the disadvantages is that India's economic and trade relations with ASEAN are unlikely to improve substantially in the near future. While the timing of this Foreign Ministers' meeting is a cause for celebration for both sides, it is embarrassing that the strengthening of India's economic ties with ASEAN has indeed been relatively limited over the last three decades, or at least the last decade. The reason for this is still that the convergence in the stage and level of development of the two sides has in a sense limited the complementarity and realisation of the potential of the bilateral economies. Both India and ASEAN need to optimise their economic structures and rely on the assistance of more developed external economic forces in order to achieve development, whether in terms of capital, technology, infrastructure development or industrial chain linkages, and the dilemma of "underdeveloped development", similar to that of South-South cooperation, is still evident in India's economic and trade relations with ASEAN. The second disadvantage is that in the area of security cooperation, India's current policy of external assertiveness has, in a sense, exerted some pressure on ASEAN, especially as the proximity of US-India security relations has made ASEAN think of dubious mechanisms such as QUAD and AUKUS, which aim to exacerbate the security dilemma in the Indo-Pacific region, and thus worry about it. Specifically, while there is room for cooperation between India and ASEAN on issues such as combating cross-border non-traditional security, ASEAN is bound to be wary of India's 'pull' when its behaviour is still having a negative impact on the geo-security situation in the region.
--Duan Haowen
On the occasion of the 30th year of India-ASEAN bilateral dialogue and the 10th anniversary of the India-ASEAN Strategic Partnership, India will host the 10 ASEAN Foreign Ministers for the first time at a meeting with ASEAN from 15 to 17 June. It is speculated that the meeting will provide a platform for India and ASEAN to discuss issues related to the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework (IPEF) recently announced by US President Joe Biden in Tokyo. India and most of the ASEAN countries are initial members of the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework (IPEF) and are also countries with close economic and trade relations with China, while the US is hoping to restructure the regional supply chain through the IPEF to exclude China from the regional trade and economic system. The US is hoping to restructure the regional supply chain through the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework to exclude China from the regional trade and economic system. After announcing its withdrawal from the RCEP negotiations, India has finally joined a new regional economic framework, and the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework is a good topic for India to discuss with ASEAN, both in terms of recovering from the economic downturn after the epidemic and in terms of further expanding India's influence in the Asia-Pacific region and enhancing India's status as a major power. The Indo-Pacific Economic Framework is a good topic for India to discuss with ASEAN. In retrospect, India's "Eastward Policy", as early as 1991, aimed at strengthening cooperation with Southeast Asian countries in the areas of trade and investment. After 2002, India gradually signed Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) with ASEAN countries and key East Asian countries, advancing the institutional linkages between India and the region. In November 2014, at the 12th India-ASEAN Summit in Myanmar, Prime Minister Narendra Modi made clear his intention to upgrade India's "Eastward Policy" to an "Eastward Action Policy "India's intention is to promote a new era in India's relations with ASEAN. Since then, India has not only boosted its domestic economy by strengthening economic and trade cooperation with ASEAN countries, but has also expanded its influence in the region through deepening areas of cooperation, adding weight to its efforts to play the role of a great power. Over the past few years, relations between India and ASEAN have not suffered more than a few twists and turns through increased investment and trade flows, as well as cooperation in the areas of security and defence. At this stage, the US sees India as a key partner in its Indo-Pacific strategy and wants India to play an important role in the multilateral security system in the Asia-Pacific region. For India's part, it also wants to strengthen its economic integration with ASEAN countries to help the country's economy recover slowly after the epidemic, while further strengthening its security and defence cooperation with ASEAN countries and expanding its influence in the Asia-Pacific region. This would serve India's dream of becoming a great power while also balancing China's growing influence.
-- Hu Wenyuan
Since the end of the Cold War, many of the issues that had previously hindered the development of India-ASEAN relations have been resolved and the relationship has grown rapidly. In 2014, Modi announced at the 12th India-ASEAN Summit that the "Eastward Policy" would be upgraded to an "Eastward Action Policy" to further deepen India's political, economic and security cooperation with Southeast Asian countries. "The year 2022 is an important milestone in India-ASEAN bilateral relations, marking both the 30th anniversary of India-ASEAN dialogue and the 10th anniversary of the India-ASEAN Strategic Partnership. It is also the 10th anniversary of the establishment of the Strategic Partnership and the India-ASEAN Friendship Year, for which both sides have organised many commemorative events. India and ASEAN are important actors in the Indo-Pacific region, and it is an important question to study how India-ASEAN relations and the Indo-Pacific Strategy will interact with each other under the US Indo-Pacific Strategy, as India is, after all, a key player in US strategic considerations. After all, India is a key player in US strategic considerations and also looks to ASEAN to play a 'central' role. While India and ASEAN have jointly affirmed and emphasised their historically similar values and traditions, and have stated that India's Indo-Pacific Initiative and ASEAN's Indo-Pacific Vision are shared visions, India's and ASEAN's views on the Indo-Pacific Initiative and the ASEAN-Indo-Pacific Vision are also important. India and ASEAN have always had different perceptions of the Indo-Pacific concept. "While India has publicly acknowledged the "centrality" of ASEAN in the Indo-Pacific since the rise of the Indo-Pacific concept, and has said that the ASEAN-India partnership will play a decisive role in the region, its focus in the Indo-Pacific region is not on relations with ASEAN, but on relations with the US and Japan. But in reality, its focus in the Indo-Pacific is not on relations with ASEAN, but with the US and Japan. For India, the positioning of India in the US Indo-Pacific Strategy not only satisfies India's vanity as the "number one power in the Indian Ocean", but India can also use the power of the US and its allies to hinder China's growing influence in the Indian Ocean. ASEAN, for its part, occupies a "central position" in the Asia-Pacific structure, but is relatively marginalised in the Indo-Pacific structure. While both sides were initially cautious about the Indo-Pacific concept, emphasising its openness and inclusiveness, there has been a clear shift in India's approach, precisely because of the differences between India and ASEAN's perceptions of the concept. Since 2019, India has been actively involved in the US Indo-Pacific Strategy, and the US-Japan-India-Australia summit in 2021 is seen by many scholars as a sign of India's alliance with the US, Japan, India and Australia in the Indo-Pacific Strategy. While ASEAN's approach to the Indo-Pacific Strategy has been one of neutrality, the India-ASEAN bilateral relationship has made considerable progress, but due to their different expectations and interests in the Indo-Pacific Strategy, the two sides have been unable to reach a consensus on whether the Indo-Pacific Strategy can be implemented in the future. It remains to be seen whether the relationship can make substantial progress under the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework (IPEF).
--Zhong Ai
The year 2022 marks the 30th anniversary of the dialogue between India and ASEAN, and India and ASEAN have organised a series of events around this theme. The foreign ministers' meeting in mid-June will coordinate positions and build consensus on international hotspot issues, paving the way for the G20 and ASEAN-India summits to follow. According to media speculation, the topics of the foreign ministers' meeting are likely to cover areas such as regional economic cooperation, maritime security cooperation, Myanmar issues, tackling the epidemic and climate change. As promoting post-epidemic economic recovery is the main theme of the Indo-Pacific region, regional economic cooperation may be the key topic of the meeting. This may be an opportunity to explore areas of cooperation under the IPEF framework, especially as most ASEAN members and India have opted to join the US-led Indo-Pacific Economic Framework (IPEF). In addition, the Newcastle pneumonia epidemic, coupled with the Russia-Ukraine conflict, has highlighted the issue of global food security, with prices of important agricultural products running at a high level and agricultural importers such as the Philippines and Singapore facing tremendous pressure. Therefore, close economic and trade cooperation with India in agricultural products to ensure regional and national food security may also become a task for the foreign ministers of Southeast Asian countries during their trip. However, considering that negotiations on the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework (IPEF) have only been officially launched, the establishment of a new regional economic cooperation framework is costly and time-consuming, and for India and ASEAN, who are eagerly awaiting economic recovery, the IPEF will at best serve as a "It is difficult to give practical impetus to economic and trade cooperation between the two sides in the short term. In addition, as the world's second largest producer of wheat, India was hit by a heat wave this year, and in order to ensure its own food reserves, it recently announced a sudden ban on wheat exports, and it is still unknown whether it will agree to expand its agricultural exports to Southeast Asian countries. Therefore, the Southeast Asian media and academia generally believe that the current regional situation is complex, India and ASEAN member countries have different "social circles", overlapping aspirations and visions, but also in the major issues of conflicting interests, do not have too much expectation for the outcome of the foreign ministers meeting.
--Li Zhifei