How does the United States view ASEAN under the "great power competition"?
Ding Duo, South China Sea Research Institute
Deputy director of the Institute of marine law and policy, Associate Researcher
Source: China Daily
Abstract: Starting next month, China, Cambodia, Indonesia and Thailand will successively host the BRICs leaders' meeting, the East Asian Cooperation leaders' meeting series, the G20 summit and the APEC informal leaders' meeting, opening the "Asian moment" of global governance. It should be noted that East Asia has formed a regional cooperation framework centered on ASEAN, which is the key to maintaining peace and stability in the region. A week before the U.S. - ASEAN summit, Cambodia, Indonesia and Thailand jointly issued a statement stressing that the international community should unite to meet challenges and develop in an open and inclusive manner.
The US ASEAN summit was held in Washington a few days ago. The heads of state or government of eight of the ten ASEAN countries attended the summit, which attracted the attention of the international community. ASEAN is the fourth largest market in the world, and the United States is the largest source of foreign direct investment in ASEAN. In 2020, the bilateral trade volume exceeded 360billion US dollars. It is undeniable that Washington has great influence in Southeast Asia, although this influence has weakened in recent years. There are many reasons for this change. For example, China's soft and hard power, especially its economic and scientific and technological strength, has been rapidly improved; The adjustment of U.S. policy towards China has led to the overall intensification of competition between the United States and China in many fields, and Southeast Asian countries have become more cautious about getting involved in the big power game; Although the Biden administration proposed a new version of the "Indo Pacific strategy" in February this year, it still has obvious weaknesses in the economic field; The conflict between Russia and Ukraine and the changes in the security situation in Europe have in fact affected Washington's strategy and resource investment in Southeast Asia.
Against this background, the summit and its outcomes of the United States and ASEAN have several aspects worthy of attention. From the perspective of agenda arrangement and substantive content, the summit can be regarded as an important step for the United States to implement the "Indo Pacific Strategy". The Biden administration did not get rid of looking at Southeast Asia from the perspective of strategic competition between the United States and China. Hidden issues of China-US competition can be seen from time to time at the summit. However, through the press briefing given by the White House and the speeches by Biden, Harris and Pelosi, it can be seen that Washington is also trying to desalinate the geopolitical color of the summit, and the economic agenda is one of the focuses of the summit. The reason is that the United States needs to take into account the feelings of ASEAN, as well as the "characteristics" of the so-called "openness and inclusiveness" of the Indo Pacific strategy. In the view of the United States, China's strong economic influence in the region poses a severe challenge to its dominant position, so it must consolidate its position by strengthening economic ties with Southeast Asia.
It is worth noting that recently, Chinese officials and scholars have made extensive and sustained criticisms of the United States for inciting camp confrontation and establishing small groups around the world. Some ASEAN countries also expressed concern about the division of the international community and the resurgence of cold war thinking. Although Washington has repeatedly stressed its support for the centrality of ASEAN, what the United States has done in diplomatic practice is to maximize the "instrumental value" of ASEAN countries. One detail is that the US ambassador to ASEAN has been vacant for many years, and Biden did not hold bilateral meetings with ASEAN leaders at the summit. The United States has strengthened its alliance and partnership, and built a small multilateral mechanism in the region with the "QUAD" and "AUKUS" as the pillars. In fact, it has weakened the dominant position of ASEAN in regional security affairs. It is difficult to regard this approach as respect for ASEAN. Its starting point is not the common interests of Southeast Asia, but the strategic interests of the United States in reshaping China's surrounding environment.
At the summit, the United States put forward cooperation initiatives in many fields for ASEAN, including climate change, clean energy and transportation infrastructure, space cooperation, digital economy development, people to people and cultural exchanges and higher education, maritime law enforcement, medical cooperation, etc. Behind these varied cooperation projects is the relatively limited investment of the United States in Southeast Asia. The $150million investment Biden announced to ASEAN is far lower than the amount of aid the US Congress plans to provide to Ukraine. If the average number reaches 10 ASEAN countries, the investment will be even more stretched. In contrast, in the first four months of this year, the bilateral trade volume between China and ASEAN reached nearly 290billion US dollars, an increase of 9.4% year-on-year.
At present, the main concern of ASEAN countries is still to achieve economic recovery and improve people's livelihood as soon as possible in the context of the epidemic. Although the above cooperation initiatives outline a seemingly bright prospect for the cooperation between the United States and ASEAN, the extent to which they can meet the short - and medium-term practical needs of ASEAN countries is also full of uncertainty. In essence, these initiatives have not overcome the shortcomings of the US India Pacific Strategy, that is, they lack systematic and pragmatic cooperation ideas and feasible paths in the economic field, and it is difficult to effectively connect with the ASEAN countries' own development strategies.
In the list of achievements, maritime affairs, law enforcement, medical cooperation and higher education are the continuation and expansion of previous cooperation. Investment in intelligent infrastructure may be attractive to ASEAN countries, but in terms of improving infrastructure conditions, most other ASEAN countries except Singapore do not have the urgent need and economic guarantee to promote the intelligent development of infrastructure. As for more specific cooperation projects such as private sector training and elite talent training, the beneficiaries of the implementation are not the social people of ASEAN countries, nor even the ruling authorities, but more likely the pro american people in the elite class of these countries.
In particular, maritime cooperation is presented as a separate item in the list of outcomes and the joint statement. In this field, Washington announced to spend $60million on the new regional maritime plan, most of which will be led and implemented by the U.S. Coast Guard (USCG), including personnel and equipment deployment, combating IUU fishing activities, equipment assistance and personnel training. This reflects that the United States has focused on this issue, and also indicates that the US Coast Guard will be more involved in maritime security affairs in the South China Sea in the future.
The maritime cooperation between the United States and ASEAN is based on the alliance and partnership of the United States in the region, and has become a priority area of cooperation in recent years. During his talks with ASEAN leaders, US Vice President Harris also mentioned the importance of safeguarding freedom of navigation and international law. Considering that China and some countries have disputes over territorial sovereignty and maritime delimitation in the South China Sea, the US move also has the purpose of containing China's activities in the South China Sea and attracting other parties to the dispute.
Starting next month, China, Cambodia, Indonesia and Thailand will successively host the BRICs leaders' meeting, the East Asian Cooperation leaders' meeting series, the G20 summit and the APEC informal leaders' meeting, opening the "Asian moment" of global governance. It should be noted that East Asia has formed a regional cooperation framework centered on ASEAN, which is the key to maintaining peace and stability in the region. A week before the U.S. - ASEAN summit, Cambodia, Indonesia and Thailand jointly issued a statement stressing that the international community should unite to meet challenges and develop in an open and inclusive manner.
The world today faces the choice of unity and division, cooperation and confrontation. The Cold War mentality will only undermine the framework of global peace, and group confrontation will only exacerbate the security challenges of the 21st century. In this sense, no matter what regional strategy is proposed, the goal should be mutual benefit and win-win, not zero sum game. (end)
“大国竞争”下,美国如何看待东盟?
本文摘要
下个月起,中国、柬埔寨、印尼、泰国将先后举办金砖国家领导人会晤、东亚合作领导人系列会议、G20峰会、亚太经合组织领导人非正式会议,开启全球治理“亚洲时刻”。应当看到,东亚地区业已形成以东盟为中心的区域合作架构,这是保持本地区和平稳定的关键。在美国-东盟峰会召开前一周,柬埔寨、印度尼西亚和泰国联合发表声明,强调国际社会要团结应对挑战,开放包容发展。
丁 铎
中国南海研究院
海洋法律与政策研究所副所长
副研究员
本文来源:中国日报网
正文篇幅约2300字,转载请注明原出处
5月12日,参加美国-东盟特别峰会的领导人在白宫前合影留念
美国-东盟峰会日前在华盛顿举行,东盟十国中有八个国家的国家元首或政府首脑出席会议,备受国际社会瞩目。东盟是全球第四大市场,美国是东盟最大的外商直接投资来源,2020年的双边贸易额超过3600亿美元。不能否认的是,华盛顿在东南亚地区有着巨大的影响力,尽管这种影响力在近年来有所减弱。导致这种变化的原因有很多,例如中国软硬实力特别是经济、科技实力快速提升;美国调整对华政策并导致美中两国在诸多领域的竞争全面加剧,东南亚国家对于卷入大国博弈愈发谨慎;拜登政府虽然今年二月份提出了新版“印太战略”,但其依然在经济领域存在明显的短板;俄乌冲突和欧洲安全局势的变化,也在事实上影响了华盛顿对东南亚地区的战略和资源投入。
在这样的背景下,美国和东盟此次峰会及其成果有几个值得关注的方面。从议程安排和实质内容来看,峰会可以被认为是美国落实“印太战略”的重要步骤。拜登政府没有摆脱从美中战略竞争视角来看待东南亚,峰会上不时可见中美竞争的隐藏议题。但是,透过白宫给出的新闻简报和拜登、哈里斯、佩洛西的演讲也可以看出,华盛顿也在努力淡化峰会的地缘政治色彩,经济议程是峰会的焦点之一。究其原因,既有美国需要顾及东盟感受的因素,也有突显印太战略所谓“开放包容”这一“特色”的考量。在美国看来,中国在本地区强大的经济影响力对其主导地位构成严峻挑战,所以必须通过加强与东南亚地区的经济联系来巩固自身地位。
值得注意是,近段时间中国官方和学者对于美国在全球范围内煽动阵营对抗、建立小集团等做法提出了广泛而持续的批评。一些东盟国家对于国际社会分裂、冷战思维回潮也表达了担忧。虽然华盛顿多次强调其对东盟中心性的支持,但在外交实践上美国所做的却是把东盟国家的“工具性价值”最大化。一个细节是多年来美国驻东盟大使一直空缺,在本次峰会上拜登也没有分别与东盟各国领导人举行双边会见。美国强化同盟和伙伴关系,以“四国机制(QUAD)”“三边安全伙伴关系(AUKUS)”为支柱在地区构建小多边机制等做法,事实上削弱了东盟在地区安全事务上的主导地位。这种做法很难被认为是对东盟的尊重,其出发点不是东南亚地区的共同利益,而是美国在重塑中国周边环境上的战略利益。
在此次峰会上,美国面向东盟提出了诸多领域的合作倡议,包括气候变化、清洁能源和交通运输基础设施、空间合作、数字经济发展、人文交流与高等教育、海事执法、医疗合作等。在这花样繁多的合作项目背后是美国对东南亚地区相对有限的经费投入。拜登宣布的向东盟提供的1.5亿美元投入远远低于美国国会计划向乌克兰提供的援助金额。如果再平均到东盟十个国家,这种投入力度就更加显得捉襟见肘。作为对比,今年前4个月,中国与东盟双边贸易额达到近2900亿美元,同比增长9.4%。
当前,东盟国家面临的最主要关切事项仍然是在疫情背景下尽快实现经济复苏和改善民生。上述合作倡议虽然为美国与东盟合作勾勒出了看似美好的前景,但在多大程度上能够满足东盟国家中短期的现实需求,也充满了不确定性。这些倡议在本质上并没有克服美国印太战略上的不足,即在经济领域缺少系统、务实的合作构想和可行路径,很难与东盟国家的自身发展战略有效对接。
在成果清单中,海事及执法、医疗合作、高等教育多是以往合作的延续与拓展。关于智能型基础设施的投资对东盟国家可能有一定吸引力,但就改善基础设施条件而言,除新加坡外的其他绝大部分东盟国家当前并没有推动基础设施向智能型发展的迫切需求和经济保障。至于私营部门培训和精英人才培训等更为具体的合作项目,落实下来的受益者并不是东盟国家的社会民众,甚至也不是执政当局,而更可能是这些国家精英阶层中的亲美人士。
特别需要指出的是,海事合作在成果清单和联合声明中是作为单独的一项提出的。在这一领域,华盛顿宣布斥资6000万美元,用于新的区域海事计划,其中大部分项目将主要由美国海岸警卫队(USCG)牵头执行,包括人员和装备部署、打击IUU捕捞活动、装备援助、人员培训。这反映出美国将此作为重点关注事项,也预示着美国海警未来会更多介入南海地区的海上安全事务。
5月19日,美国马里兰州,拜登登上“空军一号”,准备开启上任以来的首次亚洲之行
美国与东盟的海事合作是以美国在本地区的盟友关系和伙伴关系为依托的,并且在近年来成为优先合作领域。在与东盟领导人会谈时,美国副总统哈里斯也提及了维护航行自由和国际法的重要性。考虑到中国与部分国家在南海存在领土主权和海洋划界争议,美国此举也有牵制中国南海活动、拉拢其他争端当事国的目的。
下个月起,中国、柬埔寨、印尼、泰国将先后举办金砖国家领导人会晤、东亚合作领导人系列会议、G20峰会、亚太经合组织领导人非正式会议,开启全球治理“亚洲时刻”。应当看到,东亚地区业已形成以东盟为中心的区域合作架构,这是保持本地区和平稳定的关键。在美国-东盟峰会召开前一周,柬埔寨、印度尼西亚和泰国联合发表声明,强调国际社会要团结应对挑战,开放包容发展。
当今世界面临团结与分裂、合作与对抗的选择,冷战思维只会破坏全球和平框架,集团对抗只会加剧21世纪安全挑战。从这个意义上讲,无论提出何种区域战略,目的都应该是互利共赢,而不是零和博弈。(完)