[China & SEA]Has ASEAN changed?
Zhang Yunling, Expert of the Academic Committee of the Globalization Think Tank (CCG) and Member of the Academic Department of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences
The link to the original article is here.,
Recently, there has been a lot of talk about ASEAN, as the US convened a meeting with ASEAN leaders in Washington to upgrade their relationship to a "comprehensive strategic partnership" and most ASEAN members are participating in the US-led "Indo-Pacific Economic Framework", among other things. Some commentators argue that ASEAN has changed. Given the close relationship between our country and ASEAN, it is natural to be concerned about whether ASEAN has changed.
My answer: basically unchanged, but with adjustments.
What are the aspects that have remained basically unchanged?
In my view, there are three fundamental unchanged aspects of ASEAN: firstly, ASEAN solidarity, secondly, openness and development, and thirdly, ASEAN centrality.
By ASEAN solidarity, we mainly mean that member countries are united in regional co-construction and work together to safeguard the fundamental interests of ASEAN. ASEAN is not a regional management organisation, but a regional consultation and cooperation organisation. A former senior ASEAN official emphasised that it is not correct to translate ASEAN as ASEAN in Chinese, but we are not an "alliance", but an "association", with "alliance" being the agreement of laws and regulations, and "association" being consensus. ASEAN is a consensus reached through consultation and cooperation is based on consensus, and the goals are achieved through the efforts of the member countries, not by the organisation.
While ASEAN recognises the diversity of its members in terms of national systems, modes of governance and external relations, it shares the same goal of regional co-construction. Internally, the members work together to build the ASEAN Community and make Southeast Asia a region of peace and development. Externally, the member states are working together as a group to make their voices heard and to fight for ASEAN's interests. Despite the many internal and external changes, the fundamentals of ASEAN unity remain unchanged. In looking at ASEAN, it is important to note that ASEAN unity is not about what we oppose together, but what we do together, as opposed to the traditional alliances and confrontations.
By openess and development, we mean that ASEAN has always given priority to promoting development by opening up to the outside world. From the construction of preferential trade arrangements and FTAs, to the promotion of the 10+1 dialogue and cooperation mechanism and FTAs, to the leading role in the construction of the RCEP (Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement), all of these are aimed at promoting openness and economic development, both internally and externally. Here, it can be recalled that in 1997, when the Southeast Asian economy was hit hard by the severe financial and economic crisis, ASEAN did not adopt protectionist measures, but accelerated the construction of the FTA and increased its openness. This is because this is the only way to improve the regional economic development environment, attract inward investment into the region and promote economic rebound.
ASEAN took the lead in building the FTA with China and decided to take the lead in promoting the RCEP negotiations at a time when protectionism and unilateralism were rampant. ASEAN promotes a collective openness agenda, but does not restrict its members from participating in other openness arrangements. For example, when the US promoted the TPP (Trans-Pacific Partnership) and the Japan-led CPTPP (Comprehensive and Progressive Trans-Pacific Partnership), and when the US launched the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework, some ASEAN members chose to participate on their own.
With limited resources within ASEAN, relying on external markets and attracting inward investment is an important guarantee for the economic development of ASEAN members. We have seen that although the epidemic has still not receded, ASEAN countries are all doing their best to implement positive opening measures while coping with the epidemic, vigorously attracting industrial transfers and innovative investments to accelerate economic development. With the world economy under increasing downward pressure, ASEAN could become a bright spot for economic growth, which will undoubtedly enhance ASEAN's attractiveness for supply chain restructuring. It is worth noting that ASEAN's insistence on openess and development, focusing on creating a regional enabling environment for development and achieving enhancement through participation, rather than trying to dominate rule-making.
By ASEAN centrality, we mean that ASEAN has taken ownership of the planning and promotion of its agenda, and has maintained its autonomy in the development of its external relations. In terms of autonomous planning and agenda promotion, ASEAN has done a lot of things, mainly building a multi-layered and multi-directional ASEAN+ dialogue and cooperation mechanism, with ASEAN taking the lead in promoting the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), the Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM) and the RCEP negotiations. These mechanisms are not only beneficial to the development of ASEAN itself, but also to East Asia and the connected regions.
ASEAN as a cooperation zone of 10 countries is very attractive, both in terms of geo-strategic and practical interests. ASEAN's friends themselves joke that ASEAN is like a not so pretty, but attractive young woman, and that everyone wants to come and deal with ASEAN. This is good for ASEAN because it brings benefits and enhances its influence, but it also carries the risk of internal division or forcing a choice of sides. In this case, preserving ASEAN as the centre is a guarantee of ASEAN's centrality, benefiting and not harming. In fact, in a situation of great power rivalry, the ASEAN centrality approach is a wise choice of "keeping the ball rolling". It is worth noting that the ASEAN centrality approach is not based on a rejectionist mindset, but rather an open mindset, not seeking ASEAN dominance, but seeking ASEAN orientation (driver seat). ASEAN has many problems and challenges, and it is not easy to maintain a positive development in a complex situation.
The adjustments made by ASEAN are mainly to external relations. ASEAN is an open region and the principles and characteristics of its external relations can be summarised simply as: dual track and balance. By dual track, we mean the external relations of each member state and the external relations of ASEAN as a whole. Each member state conducts its own external relations in such a way that they are not contrary to the overall interests of ASEAN, and ASEAN represents its member states as a whole in dealing with the outside world (both national and international organisations) to compete for and generate benefits for ASEAN. By balance, we mean that ASEAN as a whole operates in a balanced manner, firstly, internally and externally, to prevent external domination, and secondly, between external forces, especially among the major powers, to restrain "dominance" and prevent conflict in the region.
The US's comprehensive strategic competition with China has kicked off a major strategic collision between the US and China. ASEAN has a close relationship with both the US and China, and not choosing sides is a fundamental strategic choice. Not choosing sides is not making a choice, but making a "balanced choice" based on ASEAN's interests, which can also be called a "parallel choice". Balance is not the same as equality and parallelism is not the same as equidistance, and the choice is mainly based on self-interest.
President Biden stated that a new era of US-ASEAN relations has begun, inviting ASEAN to participate in the US strategic design. As far as ASEAN-US relations are concerned, on the whole, ASEAN is neither dovetailing nor opposing the US strategic drive, interacting and linking with the US while maintaining as much autonomy as possible. When the US proposed the Indo-Pacific Strategy, ASEAN did not oppose it, but accepted the concept of the Indo-Pacific and issued a document on its autonomous participation in the Indo-Pacific Strategy (ASEAN Indo-Pacific Vision). ASEAN emphasises that the Indo-Pacific is a collective term for the Asia-Pacific and Indian Ocean regions, that ASEAN is at the centre, that the basic principles of participation in the Indo-Pacific are ASEAN-centred, that the Indo-Pacific framework should be inclusive, that ASEAN should play a leading role in the Indo-Pacific economic and security framework (to lead the shaping), that it should play the role of a broker in the multiple competitions, and that it should participate in and uphold the basic framework and principles of state relations set by ASEAN. It should also participate in and uphold the basic framework and principles of ASEAN relations, so as to facilitate the building of the ASEAN community and achieve a win-win situation. ASEAN does not participate in the AUKUS security alliance and the Quadripartite Dialogue mechanism promoted by the US. The US promotes the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework (IPEF), in which most ASEAN members participate, but ASEAN does not participate collectively. The US invited ASEAN countries to host a US-ASEAN leaders' meeting in Washington to upgrade the US-ASEAN relationship to a comprehensive strategic partnership, but in the joint statement, ASEAN made it clear that the US would respect the basic rules set by ASEAN, such as the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC) ASEAN's centrality and its autonomous position on its participation in the Indo-Pacific Strategy, etc. It is clear that ASEAN is positive about developing its relationship with the US, but is trying to maintain its autonomy and avoid being overly skewed and caught in a spiral of strategic competition.
The situation is a little more complex in terms of the relations of member states with the United States. The US has a special relationship with some ASEAN countries, including the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand, which are military allies, and Vietnam, which is a non-allied partnership, and all these countries have the will and interest to maintain their special relationship with the US. However, for practical reasons, when dealing with the US and China, they also try to maintain "parallel development" as far as possible, striving to achieve a "smart balance" in a complex and changing situation. This balance has the meaning of dynamic adjustment, and under certain circumstances, for reasons of self-interest, a non-balanced and flexible approach will be adopted, but only under exceptional circumstances will it be overly tilted, or even lopsided, which, as yet, has not happened.
China borders ASEAN and the two sides not only have a special proximate geopolitical relationship, but have also developed a close link of interests. For a number of reasons, China's relations with a number of Southeast Asian countries were not good for some time after the Second World War, with political confrontations, conflicts and even wars occurring, and disputes in the South China Sea were also difficult to resolve for a while. Since the end of the Cold War, the two sides have gradually developed a comprehensive strategic partnership through the "dual-track mechanism", and the role of ASEAN has been instrumental in improving and strengthening their relations. The two sides have found a convergence of interests, reached a strategic consensus and strengthened the foundation of their interests.
China has placed its relations with ASEAN in a prominent position in its diplomacy and supports the basic strategy of ASEAN-centric and ASEAN participation in the Indo-Pacific. China is ASEAN's most important partner, and in some respects, its role is irreplaceable. Therefore, both ASEAN members and ASEAN as a whole attach great importance to the development of relations with China. On the whole, it is the basic consensus of ASEAN members to develop relations and strengthen cooperation with China. In the outlook paper on ASEAN's participation in the Indo-Pacific Strategy, it is emphasised that the Indo-Pacific Strategy should be inclusive and that the intention is not to encircle China. During the US-ASEAN Summit and when participating in the US-led Indo-Pacific Economic Framework (IPEF), ASEAN leaders made it clear that they did not want to, and could not, decouple from China. This is true of ASEAN countries, whose industrial chains are closely linked to China.
However, as ASEAN enjoys more concessions from the US (and other allies) and China is subject to more constraints, many of China's competitive advantages may be reduced, which is perhaps what many ASEAN countries would like to see.
It is worth pointing out that two factors have a significant impact on China's relations with ASEAN: firstly, the South China Sea dispute; and secondly, the strategic rivalry between China and the United States, which is subject to internal and external factors that can lead to occasional shocks and possible tensions.
China is facing a different ASEAN and ASEAN countries than before. ASEAN and China both cooperate and retain distance, and the elastic tension between cooperation and distance is affected by complex factors; well handled cooperation will enhance resilience, poorly handled distance will widen. In the new situation, China's relationship with ASEAN needs to be more resilient.