[East Asia]Reflections on the Changes in East Asia under the New Situation

Author: Zhang Yunling, Director, Institute of International Studies, Shandong University

Unofficially Translated from https://mp.weixin.qq.com/s/w6b8pp-T_pF-fqArcbjaFA

I. Reconfiguration of the East Asian Economic Network

East Asia is the centre of gravity of the world economy and the centre of world economic growth. As the most dynamic region, East Asia is characterised by the following features: Firstly, countries have adopted a universal policy of open development, participating in regional and global industrial chains, and forming a closely interconnected industrial division of labour and supply chain among economies. In this complex network system, different companies seek their own strategies, layouts and ways of participation according to their own structures and interests. The differences in the level of economic development, economic resources and factor endowments of the economies in the East Asia region provide room for all parties to make inclusive choices.

Secondly, the openness of the East Asian economic network is reflected in two aspects: firstly, it does not draw political lines and accommodates the participation of various economies, which is very politically inclusive; secondly, it is in the form of a regional network as a whole, which has established close connections with the world, mainly North America and Europe (EU), forming a division of labour and supply chain structure based on the different characteristics of the region. By 'regional network as a whole', we mean that the US and Europe have also embraced this regional construction of East Asia based on political inclusiveness.

In the East Asian regional economic network, China has gradually become an important market and connecting centre, and its structure and role as a connecting centre is constantly being adjusted as the level of economic development increases. On the one hand, China's low-end industries are moving to low-cost countries in Southeast Asia, expanding the space of the regional market network; on the other hand, enterprises are making a comprehensive layout of the regional market, thus forming the third major restructuring of the regional economy in East Asia. The first of these three regional economic restructuring exercises in East Asia was the construction of the East Asian regional economic chain with Japan as the "leading goose" and the participation of the "Four Little Dragons"; the second was the gradual establishment of China as the centre of the East Asian processing and manufacturing regional network; and the third was the construction of a regional economic system based on unified rules of openness and engagement with the East Asian region as a large platform, based on the signing of the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement (RCEP) by 15 countries, which established a framework for opening up regional markets based on unified rules.

The third major restructuring encountered difficulties for the following reasons: for one thing, the combined effects of the epidemic, in particular the disruption of supply chains, changed the structure that had been established based on the division of labour. Some of this may be difficult to recover from after the epidemic. At the same time, the security concerns highlighted by the epidemic and other factors have important implications for the construction of industrial chains and supply chains based on the efficient division of labour. Secondly, out of concern for development security, both at the government level and at the company level will readjust the layout of industrial chains, placing emphasis on reliable and trustworthy supply chain circles, increasing security and increasing selectivity. In particular, the production and supply of sensitive products and technologies that are related to national security and livelihoods are kept in the country as much as possible or given to reliable partners to participate. Thirdly, political factors have increased, mainly because the US is promoting a comprehensive competitive strategy against China, drawing in allies and other countries to build a "circle of trust" and a "like-minded" supply chain to exclude China, especially in high-tech and highly competitive areas. This is a way of building a fence around China.

In this way, the East Asian regional industrial division of labour and industrial chains, which are based on regional competitive comparative advantages, are dismembered. The layout of the industrial division of labour in East Asia is based on two foundations: firstly, a gradient division of labour according to the overall level of economic development, also known as the vertical structure, where technology and production are adjusted and transferred from top to bottom as competitiveness shifts; secondly, the layout and setting up of supply chains according to market network mechanisms, forming horizontal agglomeration supply chain networks, which also adjust to changes in industrial structure. The combined impact of the epidemic, development security and strategic competition can undermine the market and efficiency logic of industrial upgrading and supply chain construction in East Asia. The Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) provides a legal framework based on universal openness and common adherence to rules, but its implementation will be constrained by these factors.

The dynamism of the East Asian region comes from its commitment to openness, inclusiveness and cooperation, and if it becomes 'fragmented' due to political and other factors, the converging dynamics of regional economic development are eroded. In particular, if China is isolated from production, technology and services, then East Asia lacks an intrinsic pillar of support and source of dynamism. China has developed a "double-circle" development strategy that links the internal and external worlds, with the aim of linking China's economic development more closely to that of the external world. East Asia is naturally the hub of this linkage, as the rapid development of the Chinese economy is the engine of economic growth in the region, an important connecting centre for production and services in East Asia, and a key factor in promoting industrial and technological upgrading in the region. In particular, China is increasingly taking the lead in the development and application of new technologies, and by separating China from other economies, the East Asian region would lose its dynamism and centrality. Therefore, in the East Asian regional cooperation mechanism, there is a need to make how to build an open, inclusive and cooperative sustainable development system in East Asia an important issue and set an agenda for cooperative action. From the perspective of world development, if East Asia loses its dynamism, the implications are enormous.

II. Building regional security in East Asia

Some people say that East Asia depends on China for its economy and the United States for its security. This is not true. As a region, East Asia has been free of war for decades and has developed in peace, which is very rare. What does East Asia's security depend on? The author believes that it relies on multiple mechanisms interacting in a complex relationship and on East Asian countries not sharing confrontational security thinking and practices. ASEAN has become a stable cornerstone of regional security in East Asia by, on the one hand, realising the basic security situation within ASEAN; and, on the other hand, promoting the construction of a multi-layered mechanism based on dialogue and cooperation. The expansion of ASEAN, which was once a war-prone region with complex relations and many conflicts, has gradually brought countries into a framework of regional cooperation and shared the principles of inter-state relations (the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia) to achieve common security and peace in the region. ASEAN regional security has become a cornerstone of regional security in East Asia. At the same time, with ASEAN at the centre, we have promoted the development of dialogue and cooperation mechanisms in the East Asian region, not only building a multi-layered framework for external dialogue and cooperation, such as the 10+1, 10+3 and East Asia Summits, bringing all East Asian countries into the framework of dialogue and cooperation, but also The ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) has been set up to discuss regional security, and an expanded meeting of ASEAN defence ministers has been convened, with the main theme of reducing differences, enhancing cooperation and maintaining peace in the East Asian region. Although these mechanisms are 'soft constraints', they have led the way, focusing dialogue on cooperation rather than leading to confrontation. This discursive leadership of the ASEAN approach has a "moral pressure" that isolates those who talk about confrontation. At the same time, ASEAN requires its dialogue partners to sign the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia and to abide by the basic principles set out therein.

In the face of the complex and changing situation, the cornerstones of stability and peace within ASEAN are firmly in place, and the direction and efforts of ASEAN to lead the discourse on cooperation and peace remain unchanged. For example, while the US has launched its Indo-Pacific Strategy based on confrontational thinking, ASEAN has put forward its "ASEAN Indo-Pacific Vision", which emphasises an autonomous strategic positioning of openness, cooperation and peace, with ASEAN at the centre, which has helped to stabilise the regional landscape and situation. This has played a role in stabilising the regional situation. ASEAN wants to develop relations with the US and its member states participate in US-promoted economic mechanisms such as the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework (IPEF), but not in security mechanisms such as the US-UK-Australia Trilateral Security Partnership (AUKUS) and the US-Japan-India-Australia Quadrilateral Mechanism (QUAD), and does not support confrontation.

The US is deeply involved in East Asia and has established military alliances with a number of countries. The primary role of military alliances is to maintain US leadership and support US strategy. After the end of the Cold War, the US has undergone a major restructuring of its relations with military allies, with only the alliance with Japan being strengthened. ASEAN member states such as Singapore, the Philippines and Thailand have all enhanced their security autonomy options while maintaining alliance ties with the US, upholding ASEAN's position and strategy of autonomous and cooperative security. 2022 saw the US work on East Asia intensify, with the first ever US-ASEAN Leaders' Meeting in Washington, D.C., mooted to elevate the relationship to a comprehensive Biden visited South Korea and Japan, convened a meeting of leaders of the "Quadrilateral Mechanism" in Japan, and announced the launch of the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework (IPEF), which has put in place a comprehensive strategic competition with China.

Following China's reform and opening up, Sino-US relations have improved and become less confrontational, reducing the pressure on other countries to choose between China and the US. However, with the rise of China's comprehensive power and influence, US strategic vigilance has increased, with the "Asia-Pacific rebalance" proposed during the Obama administration and the "America First" and "Indo-Pacific Strategy" launched under the Trump administration. "The Biden administration has launched a "comprehensive strategic competition with China". The Biden administration has adopted a two-pronged approach to strengthen the comprehensive strategic competition with China, including the development of targeted regulations, while building a substantive outreach mechanism and a joint front against China. The Biden administration's strategy of promoting a united front is based on a strategic confrontational mindset and layout that requires getting allies to follow suit and bringing other countries into the fold, which undermines the spirit of non-confrontational security dialogue and cooperation that has long been promoted and fostered in East Asia. A shift from engagement, dialogue and cooperation between China and the US to decoupling, sanctions counter-sanctions and confrontation would change the broader structure of regional security in East Asia and greatly increase the risk of conflict.

In the face of such a situation, a question to ponder is: Will security confrontation and untoward events related to confrontation occur in East Asia? The lessons of the Russia-Ukraine conflict show that war should not, and cannot, solve real security problems. Europe's history has been marked by wars and different forms of security constructs, but none of them have prevented wars from happening again. After the Second World War, Western Europe achieved common security within its domain through regional cooperation under the concept of cooperative security to prevent war within the EU. On the one hand, the EU strengthened its internal system, and on the other hand, it expanded its membership to include more countries in the scope of cooperative security and broadened the scope of cooperative security. However, the confrontational thinking and strategic layout of Europe has not been eliminated, and NATO's strategic design of protecting the internal and confronting the external has not changed. The Cold War ended in a non-war manner with the collapse of the Soviet Union, but the construction of the post-Soviet security order is still full of confrontation, which makes the risk of war increased, and the Russia-Ukraine conflict towards war leaves a difficult problem for the construction of European security.

In East Asia, on the contrary, once the general environment based on a non-confrontational security orientation is changed, the long-standing theme of peace and development in East Asia will change. Given the multiple relationships and contradictions in East Asia, once confrontational thinking and layouts prevail, multiple hotspots may be triggered. Therefore, in the face of the new situation of security in East Asia, there is a need to strengthen the dialogue on security in the multiple dialogue mechanisms in East Asia. Here, there are two leading forces that can play a crucial role. One is ASEAN's own steadfastness in not taking sides, adhering to the new security concept of common security and cooperative security, and leading the regional discourse and choice of direction; the second is China's own steadfastness and promotion of building a neighbourhood security order based on common security and cooperative security, adhering to the peaceful resolution of disputes and resolving conflicts through dialogue. Judging from the cases of China and ASEAN countries stabilising the South China Sea and China and India coldly handling border disputes, China is not only willing to do it, but can do it.

The key question is how the Sino-US relationship will develop. In my previous article, I suggested that Biden's "comprehensive strategic competition" with China is different from the Cold War confrontation, as the Cold War is a question of who destroys whom, while the comprehensive strategic competition is a question of who wins. As rivals, it is inevitable to close the other side's window of access to high technology, and it is also inevitable to try to undermine the other side's advantages, but this will not stop the "normal interaction" between the two sides, including military exchanges and cooperation on issues of global importance. From China's perspective, while strengthening its response capabilities, it should continue to promote the new concept of "non-conflict, non-confrontation, mutual respect and win-win cooperation" in its relations with major powers, promote multi-layered dialogue and cooperation with a non-confrontational strategic mindset, focus on the work of its neighbours, and stabilise the security situation in its neighbourhood. In this way, not only will China not be isolated, but it will also gain support.

Peace and development are the aspirations of most countries, and non-confrontation between China and the US is the expectation of most countries. China does not use war to build a secure environment, and most other East Asian countries do not support the use of force. The Eastern culture of tolerance and inclusiveness, and the use of reason to convince others, is prominently reflected in ASEAN's approach to regional cooperation and regional security building, the "ASEAN Way". The United States, Britain and Australia are engaged in a confrontational tripartite security partnership with a small military bloc, which will not play a big role and will hardly get many respondents; the "quadrilateral mechanism" promoted by the United States may not be acceptable to India if the confrontational tone is raised too high; as for the United Kingdom and other countries to make NATO Asian, it is not so easy to do so.

The centenary of the great change, the change in the contrast of power among the major powers, the change in the international system, the shift in the production paradigm, the impact of climate change, the impact of the technological revolution and the complex impact of the prolonged epidemic have led to the intensification of conflicts and the widening of cognitive, policy and strategic differences. In this context, it is crucial to resolve conflicts and reduce them, and to build a protective net for national, regional and global security. In Europe, there is the danger of an expanding Russia-Ukraine conflict; in East Asia, there is the risk of elevated US strategically driven confrontation. East Asia needs to maintain dialogue and cooperation, move away from the "paradigm" of thinking and strategic layout based on dominance, hegemony and confrontation, and allow the East to become the mainstream values based on tolerance, dialogue and cooperation, and promote a harmonious and coexistent security environment and order.

As the old saying goes: The way of the world is to be public. In the case of East Asia, this "public" means working together to maintain the development and security of the region.