[China & US]US-South Korea reinforces alliance cooperation to intensify regional camp dynamics
Wang Fudong, Associate Researcher, Institute of Northeast Asian Studies, China Institute of Modern International Relations
Recently, with US President Joe Biden's visit to South Korea as an opportunity, US-South Korea relations have warmed up rapidly and alliance cooperation has taken a big step forward. The US-Korea alliance itself is a product of the Cold War, and a symbol and legacy of it. After the Cold War, as countries in the region became closer, the Cold War overtones of the US-South Korea alliance were once somewhat muted. However, with the intensification of strategic competition between major powers in recent years, the US Democratic administration has made strengthening the alliance an important diplomatic strategy, and the camp-like dimension of the US-Korea alliance has increased significantly.
The main areas covered by this US-South Korea summit include three main areas: first, strengthening supply chain and economic security cooperation. The U.S. and South Korea will strengthen cooperation in areas such as semiconductors, new energy batteries, artificial intelligence, biotechnology, and nuclear energy, as well as strengthen foreign investment reviews and export controls on key technologies. The second is to expand security cooperation.
The US and South Korea announced that they will resume and expand joint military exercises in and around the peninsula, restart the Extended Deterrence Strategy Consultation (EDSCG) mechanism, and the US will deploy more strategic assets on the peninsula if necessary. Third, it will strengthen global strategic cooperation based on shared values. South Korea has announced its participation in the US-led Indo-Pacific Economic Framework (IPEF), pledged to work with the US to address "digital hegemony" and maintain an open Internet, promote democracy, human rights, the rule of law and a norm-based international order in the Indo-Pacific region, and play a greater role in the Democracy Summit and QUAD. Most of these areas are explicitly or implicitly targeted at China.
The content of this US-ROK summit is in line with that of last year's ROK-US summit, the difference being that the previous South Korean government was rather cautious and low-key in areas involving strategic competition between China and the US, while the current government's position on the core issues is clearer and emphasizes implementation. It can be said that the US-ROK alliance has taken a big step forward in terms of areas of cooperation, synergy mechanisms and target positioning. At the same time, with the support of the US, the Yoon Suk-yeol administration, which is facing a situation of a small government and a large opposition, has gradually reversed the situation of being constrained by the opposition parties in terms of personnel appointments, internal and external policies, and local elections, and has strengthened its ruling base.
While it remains to be seen how the US-South Korea alliance will be implemented, the signals it has already sent will have a significant impact on the regional situation. The US and South Korea's attempts at exclusive cooperation in high-tech and supply chain areas are bound to have a major impact on the highly integrated economic relations between China and South Korea. Given that South Korea already has an extended US deterrent guarantee and a clear advantage over the DPRK in conventional weapons, the increased US military deployment on the Korean peninsula will not only increase the DPRK's insecurity and stimulate it to counterattack forcefully, but will also pose some potential threat to neighbouring countries such as China and Russia, exacerbating the regional security dilemma. The US and South Korea's promotion of a values-based alliance in the Indo-Pacific region and the intensification of regional camping are even more contrary to the post-Cold War era's process of de-ideologising regional cooperation.
Although the US-South Korea's gesture to strengthen the alliance has come with great force, its subsequent progress is still more constrained. For one thing, South Korea's cooperation with the US in the economic, scientific and technological fields is no substitute for economic relations with China. South Korea is trying to establish its industrial superiority and avoid China's catch-up by participating in the Korea-US semiconductor alliance, for example. In 2021, a survey by the Korea International Trade Association showed that of the 12,586 items (including raw materials and components) imported by the country, 1,850 items imported from China had a dependence on China of over 80%. In November that year, China's restriction on industrial urea exports due to environmental protection nearly brought Korea's freight industry to a halt. Korea will not be able to break away from its high dependence on the Chinese industrial chain in the short term.
Secondly, South Korea believes that joining the Indo-Pacific economic framework is conducive to opening up its own economic space, but the US-led Indo-Pacific economic framework lacks substantial benefits for other member countries in terms of market access, tax and fee concessions, and even has more restrictions, making its future uncertain.
Third, on the Korean peninsula and regional issues, the new South Korean government does not share the strategic ambiguity of the previous administration, but believes that the stronger the US-South Korea alliance is, the more important South Korea's position and values will be. In fact, if South Korea were to fully follow US policy, it would exacerbate regional tensions and antagonisms, nullify its advantage of being able to play both sides of the border, marginalise itself on the peninsula and regional issues, and run counter to its ambition to become a "global pivotal state". The introduction of a significant US military presence would also lead to the country becoming the forefront of a security confrontation between the major powers, and the nuclear issue would instead be de-focused.
South Korea is also aware of these challenges and informed China of the content of the US-South Korea talks as soon as possible after Biden's visit, hoping to avoid misunderstandings on the Chinese side. The ROK stressed that the IPEF "does not exclude China" and that follow-up negotiations on the China-Korea FTA are still underway. Many South Korean economic and political elites have also called for a balance between the strategic partnership with China and relations with the US. The new Cold War is not in the interests of the majority of countries, nor is it in line with the trend of globalisation, and regional countries need to exercise restraint and prudence to avoid repeating the mistakes of history.