[ASEAN]actively responding to the great power game and trying to regain its "centrality"

By Zhang Jie, Researcher, Institute of Asia-Pacific and Global Strategy, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences.

Unofficially Translated from https://mp.weixin.qq.com/s/ZUcZScTWG2ZYdUP2ZQ3HTQ

In 2022, the internal situation in Southeast Asia was relatively stable, but it faced multiple tests from the outside, mainly dealing with four major shocks: the strategic game between China and the US, the Ukraine crisis, the COVID19 epidemic and the situation in the Taiwan Strait.

Refusing to take sides in the great power game

The political situation in Southeast Asia is basically stable. ASEAN has announced that it has largely overcome the threat of the epidemic and resumed normal economic activities. Prime Minister Hun Sen of Cambodia, the rotating chair of ASEAN, said that the overall growth rate of ASEAN will reach 5.3% in 2022, which is a remarkable achievement compared to other regions of the world. The main task for ASEAN in the coming period is to focus on economic recovery and to deal with security risks in food, energy and finance.

Four major external factors are impacting ASEAN's diplomacy and security. The strategic game between China and the US is global and decisive, leading to an accelerated reorganisation of the Asia-Pacific region and reducing the space for ASEAN countries to "choose sides". The crisis in Ukraine has further exposed Southeast Asian countries, which have been "ravaged" by the epidemic, to an energy and food crisis. The crisis in Ukraine and the warming situation in the Taiwan Strait are superimposed on each other, and under the international malicious public opinion hype and influence of "today's Ukraine, tomorrow's South China Sea" and "today's Ukraine, tomorrow's Southeast Asia", the "sense of worry" of some Southeast Asian countries has "The security stance and policy adjustments of each country are further differentiated.

ASEAN is the main body to strengthen regional governance in Southeast Asia and deal with external shocks, and "unity", "centrality" and "balance of powers" are the three "key words" of ASEAN policy. "unity", "centrality" and "balance of power" are the three "key words" of ASEAN policy. The internal logic is that maintaining ASEAN's "centrality" is an important guarantee that Southeast Asia will continue to be a hotbed of global investment and economic development, and a basis for enhancing ASEAN's strategic value in the great power game. Maintaining ASEAN's "centrality" depends on both internal and external factors: the internal factor is to consolidate ASEAN's "unity" and insist on speaking with "one voice"; the external factor is to adhere to the "balance of power" strategy. The external factor is to adhere to the "balance of power" strategy and ensure ASEAN's role as a "buffer zone" and "coordinator".

In the diplomatic practice of 2022, ASEAN countries have seized the opportunity to work together to create a "highlight moment" in Asia, and their "centrality" has regained. Cambodia, Indonesia and Thailand hosted the East Asia Cooperation Leaders' Series, the Group of Twenty (G20) Summit and the APEC Leaders' Informal Meeting in November. In May 2022, in response to pressure from the US and other Western countries to isolate Russia, the foreign ministers of Cambodia, Indonesia and Thailand issued a joint statement declaring that they would ensure a spirit of cooperation and strengthen ASEAN's "centrality" by inviting all members to the three meetings.

ASEAN still faces a number of difficulties. The Myanmar issue and the great power game have weakened ASEAN's "unity". The US move to strengthen the alliance system has intensified the struggle over the region's security architecture, directly threatening ASEAN's 'centrality'. Events such as the Ukraine crisis, the Taiwan Strait issue and the launch of the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework (IPEF) have all become touchstones for ASEAN countries to choose their positions. The answer given by ASEAN in practical terms is that diplomacy claims not to "choose sides", while at the same time "choosing sides" on specific issues according to their own interests, which to a certain extent increases the complexity of the situation in the Asia-Pacific and the uncertainty of the direction of the regional order.

If we take a longer period of time as a yardstick, we will find that ASEAN's perception of and response to the strategic game between China and the US has shown strong dynamism and strategic autonomy, roughly going through a process of "worrying and persuading peace", "clearly expressing its refusal to choose sides" and "seeking a third way". In the three stages of "fear and persuasion" and "clear expression of refusal to choose a side", ASEAN's perception of and response to the strategic game between China and the US has been more dynamic and strategically autonomous. During the "fear and persuasion" phase, ASEAN maintained close interaction with China and the US, and responded with the ASEAN Indo-Pacific Vision. "Singapore has made it clear that the big powers cannot force ASEAN to take sides, and Indonesian President Joko said in his G20 speech that ASEAN is not a "proxy" for the big powers. Some ASEAN countries have gone on to propose a "third way", that is, if China and the US cannot reach a compromise with each other, other countries need to try to build a more open and inclusive multilateral network in the fields of science, technology and supply chains, forming a "non-aligned movement", rather than leaning towards one camp or another. rather than leaning towards one camp or another. The new "Non-Aligned Movement" is still in the early stages of diplomatic discussions, and it may trigger concern and resonance among more developing countries.

Stable but tight situation in the South China Sea

The situation in the South China Sea continues to maintain the basic dynamic of fighting but not breaking, with "three major contrasts" emerging. First, the struggle at sea remains intense, but the diplomatic statements of the countries concerned are relatively restrained. China has always maintained a low-profile approach to the South China Sea. The relevant Southeast Asian countries have shifted from a high profile in the past to a relatively low profile, partly because the overall security situation in the region is volatile, and all countries are interested in avoiding simultaneous intensification of the South China Sea issue and thus "adding fuel to the fire".

Secondly, compared to the restraint of the countries directly involved in the South China Sea, extra-territorial countries, especially the US, continue to intervene, speculate and create new topics. In 2022, the US published reports such as "Report No. 150 on Maritime Boundaries", "US-China Strategic Competition in the East and South China Seas" and "China's Role in Global Fisheries Development" in an attempt to further substantiate the so-called "South China Sea Arbitration Ruling" and use "illegal fishing" to discredit China. The report also seeks to further substantiate the so-called "South China Sea arbitration ruling" and use issues such as "illegal fishing in the fishing industry" to discredit China, while strengthening security cooperation with Southeast Asian countries in areas such as maritime situational awareness.

Thirdly, the Taiwan Strait issue and the South China Sea issue form a contrast. The linkage between the Taiwan Strait and South China Sea issues has significantly strengthened, with the heating up of the situation in the Taiwan Strait triggering a high degree of concern among neighbouring countries. in August, ASEAN foreign ministers issued a joint statement in support of the one-China policy. At the same time, some Southeast Asian countries began to formulate plans to protect the security of their expatriates and investments in Taiwan. In contrast, the South China Sea issue has cooled down somewhat. However, in the longer term, the overall impact of the South China Sea issue on the surrounding environment remains significant, and the strategic game between China and the US has become a major factor in determining the situation in the South China Sea to a considerable extent.

In the coming period, China should adhere to the "dual-track approach", further implement the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea (DOC), promote the consultations on the Code of Conduct in the South China Sea (COC). Under the guidance of the Global Development Initiative (GDI) and the Global Security Initiative (GSI), the sustainability of maritime security will be achieved through the sustainable development of the oceans. China should also build up its strength and strengthen its crisis management mechanism in the South China Sea to meet the real challenges posed by the continued judicialisation, internationalisation and militarisation of the South China Sea by the US and other extra-territorial countries.